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FOREWORD 
The Brandeis Institute for International Judges (BIIJ) has established itself as 
a significant and world-renowned program that promotes the role of judges 
working in the domain of international law and justice. Organized by the 
International Center for Ethics, Justice and Public Life of Brandeis University, 
the BIIJ provides a venue for judges from international and regional courts to 
discuss important issues relating to the administration of justice across their 
varied jurisdictions. 
In 2013, the BIIJ was organized, for the first time in its 12-year history, in 
partnership with outside academic bodies working in the same field. The institute 
was held in Lund, Sweden, in collaboration with the Raoul Wallenberg Institute 
of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law and the Lund University Faculty of Law 
around the theme “The International Rule of Law in a Human Rights Era.” 
This report of the Lund session provides an extremely interesting and useful 
read for those working in the field of international justice and human rights. 
BIIJ 2013 was an enormous success. As one of the regular institute 
participants and a member of its 2013 Program Committee, I can attest that the 
intense interaction that took place in Lund between judges, who have to handle 
the delicate task of administering justice in a difficult political environment, and 
academics, who are engaged in creating a theoretical framework for international 
justice, was a valuable experience for all. 
In today’s world, globalization is not just an economic phenomenon but also 
a social reality for the international community, which consists of individual 
human beings. It is of paramount importance that international law, which sets 
the legal framework for the public order of this human community, should be 
focused on respect for human dignity through ensuring human security in every 
corner of the globe. The role of judges engaged in this endeavor—whether at the 
international, regional or national level—is of ever-increasing importance. 
The work of the 2013 Brandeis Institute for International Judges, thanks in 
part to the cooperation of the Raoul Wallenberg Institute and the Lund Faculty of 
Law, has made a substantial contribution to the cause of human security, an 
essential part of which involves the promotion of human rights through the 
proper functioning of international courts and tribunals. 
 
   Hisashi Owada 
   Judge and former President 
   International Court of Justice 
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ABOUT THE INSTITUTE 
From 28 to 31 July 2013, 16 judges from 13 international courts and 
tribunals attended the 9th Brandeis Institute for International Judges (BIIJ). The 
Institute was held in Lund, Sweden and organized in partnership with the Raoul 
Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law and Lund 
University Faculty of Law. 
Participants hailed from a wide range of judicial institutions, including those 
that address the violation of human rights by States in Africa, the Americas and 
Europe, as well as those that resolve disputes among States at the global and 
regional levels. Other participants represented institutions that investigate and try 
individuals accused of international crimes, from the International Criminal Court 
to tribunals focused on crimes committed in Cambodia, Lebanon, Rwanda, Sierra 
Leone and the former Yugoslavia.  
Sessions were held over four days around the overarching theme “The 
International Rule of Law in a Human Rights Era.” This theme was chosen 
because of the growing influence of human rights on legal thinking and practice, 
as well as on the work of international judges and their institutions. 
The first session of the Institute, led by Judge Hisashi Owada (Japan) of the 
International Court of Justice and Judge Fausto Pocar (Italy) of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, set the stage with an exploration of 
the expanding impact of human rights on international courts and tribunals.  
Participants went on to examine a number of critical subjects in 
contemporary global justice through a wide-ranging set of sessions. These 
included: the role played by State engagement and diplomacy, led by 
Ambassador Carl-Henrik Ehrenkrona (Sweden) and Justice Richard Goldstone 
(South Africa); the impact of international human rights norms at the national 
level, led by Judge Sanji Monageng (Botswana) of the International Criminal 
Court and Judge Erik Møse (Norway) of the European Court of Human Rights; 
an inquiry into the universality of human rights, led by Professor Emeritus of the 
Lund Faculty of Law Göran Melander (Sweden); and the future of international 
courts and tribunals, led by Professor Linda Carter (USA) of the McGeorge 
School of Law and Judge Pocar. 
Institute conveners Leigh Swigart and Dan Terris of Brandeis University led 
a session exploring the legitimacy of the underpinnings of the international 
justice system. They asked the question, in whose name is international law 
enacted and international justice enforced, given that it is disconnected from the 
usual systems of regulation, oversight, and accountability found in the national 
context? 
The Institute ended with a public roundtable, held in nearby Malmö at the 
famous Turning Torso building. Participants discussed various issues 
surrounding freedom of expression, including how it plays out in contemporary 
media, the connection of hate to the crime of hate speech, and the right of 
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citizens not only to speak out but also to have access to certain kinds of 
information.1 
Funding for BIIJ 2013 was provided by the Rice Family Foundation and the 
David Berg Foundation. 
 
  
 
1. Read more about the public event at http://www.brandeis.edu/ethics/news/2013/2013.July.31.html. 
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BIIJ 2013 PARTICIPANTS 
 
Participating Judges 
 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
• President Sophia Akuffo (Ghana)  
 
Caribbean Court of Justice 
• President Dennis Byron (St. Kitts and Nevis)  
 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
• Judge Rowan Downing (Australia) 
 
European Court of Human Rights 
• Judge Erik Møse (Norway) 
 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
• President Diego García-Sayán (Peru)  
 
International Criminal Court 
• Vice President Sanji Monageng (Botswana) 
• Judge Howard Morrison (United Kingdom) 
 
International Court of Justice 
• Judge Hisashi Owada (Japan) 
• Judge Dalveer Bhandari (India)  
 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
• President Vagn Joensen (Denmark)  
 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
• Vice President Carmel Agius (Malta) 
• Judge Fausto Pocar (Italy)  
 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
• Judge Helmut Tuerk (Austria) 
 
Special Court for Sierra Leone 
• Judge Shireen Avis Fisher (United States) 
 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
• President David Baragwanath (New Zealand) 
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World Trade Organization Appellate Body 
• Chair Ricardo Ramírez Hernández (Mexico) 
 
Other Participants 
• Ambassador Hans Corell (Sweden) 
• Ambassador Carl-Henrik Ehrenkrona (Sweden) 
 
BIIJ Co-Directors 
• Justice Richard J. Goldstone, former Chief Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
• Professor Linda Carter, Pacific McGeorge School of Law  
 
Brandeis University, International Center for Ethics, Justice and Public Life 
• Leigh Swigart, Director of Programs in International Justice and Society 
• Daniel Terris, Center Director 
• Rida Abu Rass ‘14, Intern 
• Anastasia Austin ‘14, Intern 
• Alex Glomset ‘14, Intern 
 
Raoul Wallenberg Institute and Lund University Faculty of Law 
• Göran Melander, RWI founding Director and Emeritus Professor 
• Christina Moëll, Dean of the Faculty of Law 
• Rolf Ring, RWI Deputy Director 
• Evgenia Pavlovskaia, Rapporteur 
• Matthew Scott, Rapporteur 
• Britta Sjöstedt, Rapporteur 
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KEY INSTITUTE THEMES 
The principal goal of BIIJ 2013 was to examine the growing influence of 
human rights on legal thinking and practice, as well as on the work of 
international judges and their institutions. This was the third session of the BIIJ 
to explore the notion of an international rule of law. Previous institutes had 
focused on the development of such a global legal framework (2010) and the role 
of coordination and collaboration in realizing it (2012). Plenary sessions in 2013 
sought to advance earlier discussions by identifying the ways in which 
contemporary international justice is influenced by the “human rights era” in 
which we live, and by sharing thoughts about how best to ensure that populations 
across the globe benefit from this heightened awareness of human rights issues. 
Sessions were organized around five themes: 
$ The Expanding Impact of Human Rights Law on International Courts and 
Tribunals 
$  The Impact of International Human Rights Norms at the National Level 
$  How Universal Are Human Rights? 
$  The Role of State Engagement and Diplomacy in International Justice 
$  The Future of International Courts and Tribunals: What Developments and 
Models Will We See in 20 Years? 
Theme 1: The Expanding Impact of Human Rights Law on International 
Courts and Tribunals 
The institute began with a session that examined a significant development 
touching all of the international courts and tribunals represented at BIIJ 2013—
the so-called “humanization” of international law. 
In the 65 years following the adoption of the United Nations Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, international law has developed an 
increasing focus on human rights and the protection of individuals from abuse by 
their own and foreign governments. At international and regional levels—in 
Africa, the Americas, and Europe—a vast number of rules, and judicial/quasi-
judicial institutions to implement them, have been developed to protect and 
expand the scope of human rights. It is clear that the protection of human rights is 
no longer exclusively under the domestic jurisdiction of States. 
The opening session explored the role played by various international courts 
and tribunals in the contemporary development of human rights jurisprudence. 
This exploration included courts established with the specific mandate to 
interpret and apply certain human rights conventions, as well as international 
courts and tribunals that have traditionally had different functions, such as the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the World Trade Organization Appellate 
Body (WTO AB). It was acknowledged that human rights principles are already 
central to the work of international criminal courts and tribunals, as they are 
called upon both to prosecute individuals who have committed gross human 
Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 28 
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rights violations—war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide—and to 
provide the alleged perpetrators of such crimes with humane detention, fair trials 
and other human rights guarantees 
Interstate Dispute Resolution Bodies and Human Rights 
The discussion began with a consideration of how human rights issues have 
been addressed over the past several decades by the ICJ, the international court 
that has the broadest geographic and subject matter jurisdiction. Participants 
considered the framework put forward by former ICJ Judge Bruno Simma,2 who 
has characterized the stance of the Court toward human rights as first one of 
hesitation and restraint, followed—but not in a strictly chronological 
progression—by one of engagement and integration. This evolution can be seen, 
according to Simma, in the treatment of human rights issues in the Tehran 
Hostages case (1980)3 and the Vienna Consular Convention cases—LaGrand 
(2001)4 and Avena (2004)5—which belong to the former phase, and the 
Palestinian Wall advisory opinion (2004)6 and Diallo case (2010),7 which focus 
squarely on allegations of human rights violations. Simma suggests that the ICJ 
is relinquishing “the spirit of Mavrommatis,”8 which views the espousing of 
individual rights as an assertion of States’ rights (see text box, page 8), in favor 
of recognizing the individual human rights aspects of cases in a more direct way. 
  
 
2. Bruno Simma, Human Rights Before the International Court of Justice: Community Interest Coming to 
Life?, in 1 COEXISTENCE COOPERATION AND SOLIDARITY: LIBER AMICORUM RÜDIGER WOLFRUM 577-603 
(Holger P. Hestermeyer et al. eds., 2012). 
3. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment (May 24, 1980), 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&case=64&code=usir&p3=4. 
4. LaGrand Case (Ger. v. U.S.), Judgment (June 27, 2001), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/ 
index.php?p1=3&p2=3&k=04&case=104&code=gus&p3=4. 
5. Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment (Mar. 31, 2004), available at  
http://www.icjcij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&k=18/&PHPSESSID=6a2e2e2f4dc8919c2d331d11e8b4ac
75&PHPSESSID=6a2e2e2f4dc8919c2d331d11e8b4ac75&case=128&code=mus&p3=4. 
6. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion (July 9, 2004), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/?p1=3&p2=4&k=5a&case=131&code 
=mwp&p3=4. 
7. Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Rep. of Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo), Judgment (Nov. 30, 2010), available at 
http://www.icjcij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&k=7a&case=103&code=gc&p3=4  
8. Simma, supra note 2, at 587. 
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Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Permanent Court of International 
Justice 1924, Series A, no. 2, 121 
 
“By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action 
or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting 
its own rights—its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the 
rules of international law. Once a State has taken up a case on behalf of one of its 
subjects before an international tribunal, in the eyes of the latter the State is sole 
claimant.”* 
 
* As cited in Simma, supra note 2, at 587. 
 
Simma concludes that for the ICJ “the human rights genie has escaped from 
the bottle.”9 He advises that “the most valuable contribution the ICJ can make to 
the international protection of human rights . . . consists of what could be called 
the juridical ‘mainstreaming’ of human rights, in the sense of integrating this 
branch of the law into the fabric of both general international law and its various 
other branches.”10 
Some participants were of the opinion that Simma’s framework was overly 
simplified, attributing too much conservatism to the ICJ in the past and perhaps 
too much faith in its new human rights sensitivities. The recent Belgium v. 
Senegal case (2012),11 in which the ICJ considered Senegal’s obligation to 
prosecute or extradite under the Torture Convention, was described by one judge 
as a “straightforward human rights case.”  It thus shows that the ICJ has 
embraced the growing trend for courts to directly address human rights 
considerations. However, in a contemporaneous case, Germany v. Italy (2012),12 
the ICJ upheld State immunity in relation to grave crimes committed during 
World War II, perhaps hailing back to a more classic and State-centered 
interpretation of international law. The latter case was one that Simma seemed to 
hope would, instead, set new “priorities between human rights 
considerations/obligations and other rules of international law, particularly State 
immunity.”13 
Human rights considerations also enter into interstate disputes at the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). It was pointed out that the 
drafters of the Law of the Sea Convention made provision for the prompt release 
of fishing crews when ships are seized for suspected violations, against the 
 
9. Id. at 598. 
10. Id. at 601. 
11. Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.), Judgment (July 20, 
2012), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&case=144&code=bs&p3=4. 
12. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece intervening), Judgment (Feb. 3, 2012), 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/143/16883.pdf. 
13. Simma, supra note 2, at 603. 
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posting of bond that serves as a guarantee for any fines that may be levied in the 
future. The rights of fishermen are thereby protected, keeping them from 
detention in potentially unacceptable conditions, without prejudging the 
substance of the dispute.14 
Finally, a participant noted that trade disputes are increasingly viewed through 
a human rights lens at the WTO Appellate Body. For example, one State’s right to 
protect its youth from smoking may come into conflict with another State’s right to 
export tobacco. Similarly, a dispute over tuna can be conceptualized as the right of 
consumers to know how the tuna they eat was caught, against the right of a country 
to export canned tuna. 
International Criminal Tribunals and Human Rights 
The discussion then proceeded to the dual role that human rights law plays in 
the proceedings of international criminal courts and tribunals. Human rights 
principles entitle every accused person to due process of law, which guarantees a 
fair trial without undue delays, and safeguards the integrity of the entire criminal 
proceeding. At the same time, a criminal proceeding seeks to promote the human 
rights of those who claim to have suffered from the acts of the accused. 
These two uses of human rights law have been termed their “shield” and 
“sword” functions.15 In a recent article, former European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) Judge Françoise Tulkens noted that this double function creates a 
paradox in which human rights assume both a defensive and offensive role, “a 
role of both neutralizing and triggering the application of criminal law.”16 
BIIJ participants generally agreed that there are multiple, and at times 
conflicting, interests to be weighed in relation to an international criminal 
proceeding. In addition to considering the rights of the accused and victims in a 
case, the following must also be taken into account: the protection of witnesses 
associated with the proceeding; the interest of the international criminal tribunal 
itself in effectively discharging its judicial role; and the international 
community’s desire to see a fair and expeditious trial, the end of impunity, and 
the deterrence of future crimes. 
One judge contested the notion that both the accused and victims in a case 
have “rights” in the same sense. While the rights of accused persons are 
enshrined in multiple human rights instruments, he characterized victims as 
having “interests” rather than rights per se. He questioned, in particular, the idea 
that a victim has the right to see a perpetrator brought to justice, noting that it is 
 
14. The provisional measures ordered in November 2013 by ITLOS for the release of the crew of a 
Greenpeace vessel seized in the waters of the Russian Federation is the most recent example of these kinds of 
protections. See the Arctic Sunrise case (Kingdom of The Neth. v. Russ. Fed’n), Case No. 22, Order of Nov. 22, 
2013, available at http://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=264&L=true#c1471. 
15. Françoise Tulkens, The Paradoxical Relationship Between Criminal Law and Human Rights, 9 J. 
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 577, 577 (2011). 
16. Id. at 579. 
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instead the right to reparation that is widely accepted. He also asked an important 
question for contemporary international criminal justice: to what reparations is an 
accused entitled if his or her rights have been egregiously violated, as in the case 
of unlawful arrest or detention? 
This is not an entirely theoretical question. In the early years of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), several 
persons accused of crimes in the Balkans were arrested under questionable 
circumstances. One participant reminded the group of the treatment of Dragan 
Nikoli , a Serbian commander charged with war crimes. He was tracked down by 
bounty hunters, knocked unconscious, bound hand and foot, and then turned over 
to United Nations forces who transported him to The Hague.  Although Nikoli  
hoped this unlawful treatment might lead to a dismissal of his case, the remedy 
was instead a reduction of sentence following his conviction.17 
The circumstances of Nikoli ’s arrest led to a lively exchange about the 
rights of the accused. A former prosecutor said that criminal tribunals should not 
condone any illegality in the arrest of a defendant; they are “in many ways 
human rights courts and should not be involved in the violations of human 
rights,” he declared. Another noted, “there may have been a place in the Wild 
West for bounty hunting, but not in the 20th century.” Moreover, this same judge 
was troubled by what he saw as the confusion of substance and procedure in the 
Nikoli  case, noting that an irregularity in his arrest should not have influenced 
the determination of his sentence. A criminal judge disagreed, explaining that as 
a human rights violation entails the right to a remedy, a reduction of Nikoli ’s 
sentence was the logical remedy following his conviction. It was noted that the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) had a similar 
situation with the illegal detention of an accused, and the Court followed the 
same reasoning as the ICTY, reducing the sentence of the accused upon 
conviction. 
The group then turned to the interests of victims in criminal cases. First, a 
conceptual challenge had to be addressed—can a victim really be considered as 
having the “right” to see a perpetrator prosecuted? A leading judgment on this 
question came from the ECtHR in X and Y v. The Netherlands (1985),18 where it 
was ruled that the impossibility of instituting criminal proceedings against the 
perpetrator of sexual assault on a minor with a mental disability breached the 
victim’s right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 of the European 
Convention).19 One BIIJ participant clarified that any such right is only to see an 
alleged perpetrator prosecuted, not convicted. 
Participants brought a variety of institutional perspectives to bear on how 
victims avail themselves of this right. Both the ECCC and the International 
 
17. Prosecutor v. Nikoli , Case No. IT-94-2-A, Judgment on Sentencing Appeal, (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the 
Former Yugoslavia Feb. 4, 2005), http://www.icty.org/case/dragan_nikolic/4. 
18. X and Y v. Netherlands, App. No. 8978/80 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. (1985). 
19. Tulkens, supra note 15, at 584. 
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Criminal Court (ICC) have formal provisions for the participation of victims in 
criminal proceedings. One judge noted that whereas the rights of accused persons 
at the ECCC have already “crystallized,” the rights of victims are instead 
solidified only upon the conviction of an accused. At that point, they may ask for 
compensation. Victims may also come forward at an earlier stage and request an 
investigation. A note of caution was added to this description of victims’ rights at 
the ECCC. A court can easily become overwhelmed when dispensing justice to 
satisfy not only its international mandate—that is, to prosecute and punish 
perpetrators—but also the demands of individual victims. This is especially true 
when resources are scarce. Another judge opined that criminal procedure is 
perhaps best understood “from the view of social interests,” adding that 
“individual benefit is secondary or even incidental to the process.” 
It was then noted that victim participation at the ICC has been taken to an 
even higher level; one judge went so far as to suggest that “victims are the 
masters.” The court is very careful to confirm that individuals have been truly 
affected by the acts of a particular accused before being granted the status of 
victim. Their interests are the mandate of the Trust Fund for Victims, which 
works with affected communities—inter alia to restore medical and educational 
resources and human resilience—even before there is a conviction. Once an 
accused is found guilty, reparations for victims can be determined. Although the 
ICC enjoys a more stable financial situation than the ECCC, it is already clear 
that making reparations to victims—especially as the numbers increase with each 
successive ICC case—will constitute a daunting challenge. 
This discussion of victims’ rights was then interrupted by another conceptual 
challenge: How can a court classify certain individuals as “victims” in a case 
before an accused has actually been convicted? Is that not “putting the cart before 
the horse”? One criminal judge suggested that another term be coined, perhaps 
“putative victim,” so that the “uncrystallized” rights of that person can be 
examined and determined. It seemed reasonable to that judge that a putative 
victim have at least the right to see a fair prosecution of the accused. 
Not everyone agreed, however, with the notion that the status of “victim” can 
only be definitively granted after a conviction. One participant pointed out that 
there are persons who are clearly victims of a regime even if individual criminals 
have not yet been identified. Most of the Cambodian population, for example, 
was targeted by Khmer Rouge activities, and there is ample evidence to show this 
even without convictions. The question to be examined through trials is whether 
particular individuals have criminal responsibility for those activities. “What we 
need,” another participant suggested, “is a new term to identify survivors of 
crimes against humanity as individuals and groups, as opposed to victims in a 
criminal context.” 
Over the past 15 years, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) 
has had occasion to rule on various issues related to such proceedings at the 
national level. Rulings of the Court are mandatory for the States that have 
accepted its jurisdiction. When there have been serious violations of human 
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rights in States that are party to the American Convention on Human Rights, 
those States then have the obligation to investigate and prosecute the individuals 
deemed responsible. This obligation has frequently conflicted, however, with 
national amnesty laws. When the IACtHR has found enough evidence, it has 
directed national judiciaries through its decisions to open multiple criminal cases, 
some of them involving the prosecution of former Heads of State. The regional 
court then monitors and supervises compliance with its decisions—sometimes 
holding hearings to receive public feedback—until there has been full 
implementation. This interaction between the IACtHR and its Member States has 
resulted in stronger criminal courts at the national level and enhanced dialogue 
between the regional and national courts.20 
The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR) is a relative 
newcomer and has not yet had to rule on criminal proceedings in member States. 
But it is already clear that questions of rights in this context are bound to arise.21 
Indeed, the ACtHPR is already receiving inquiries about how a finding of 
criminality in the investigation of a human rights violation will be handled. The 
involvement of the Inter-American Court in monitoring criminal proceedings at 
the national level can serve as a guide, one judge declared. “When human rights 
are violated, so many other blisters inevitably pop up. And part of that will be the 
question of the rights or interests of the victim.” The judge added that the 
frustration of putative victims without a means of redress may lead to many more 
problems in the future, at both the individual and societal level. “This is one of 
the reasons that it is important to always look at the rights of the victim and 
ensure that prosecution takes place in an effective manner.” 
The Question of Fragmentation 
Recognition of the increased inclusion of human rights issues across all 
categories of international courts naturally led to a discussion of the possible 
fragmentation of norms. Several judges noted the spontaneous judicial dialogue 
that has occurred among disparate courts. For example, in Germany v. Italy,22 the 
ICJ took the same approach as that followed by the ECtHR on State immunity for 
acts committed by its armed forces on the territory of another State.  In Belgium 
 
20. In August 2013, the IACtHR issued its first judgment in favor of a living survivor of Pinochet era 
abuses, finding Chile in violation of •its obligations to investigate and remedy the arbitrary detention and torture 
of• a man who was left permanently disabled by the torture• he suffered at the hands of the government in the 
1970s. Chile was ordered to pay the victim reparations. See  Garcia Lucero et. al. v. Chile, Preliminary 
Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 627 (August 28, 2013). 
21. The ACtHPR did, however, order provisional measures concerning the conditions of detention of Saif 
Al-Islam Gadaffi by the National Transitional Council of Libya, pending his criminal trial. See In the Matter of 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Libya, App. No. 002/2013, Afr. Ct. Hum. & Peoples’ 
Rts., Provisional Measures (Mar. 15, 2013), available at http://www.africancourtcoalition.org/index.php? 
option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=42&Itemid=33. 
22. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece intervening), Judgment (Feb. 3, 2012), 
supra note 12.  
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v. Senegal, the ICJ also refrained from commenting on the ECOWAS Court’s 
ruling that the principle of nullum crimen sine lege precluded Senegal from 
trying former Chadian dictator Hissène Habré under Senegalese laws.23 In 
determining crimes against humanity, the Supreme Court of Peru applied the 
same standards established by the IACtHR, following the regional court’s ruling 
on the Barrios Altos v. Peru case (2001).24 And the ICTR was very careful to cite 
international and regional jurisprudence instead of national jurisprudence in its 
judgments in order to build up a common body of human rights law. A judge 
with experience in both criminal and interstate dispute courts suggested that 
lawyers before international courts should be encouraged to make reference to 
international jurisprudence in their advocacy. “The simple development of habits 
in this area goes a long way to minimize the risk of fragmentation.” 
Other participants were not so optimistic that the fragmentation of human 
rights norms could be avoided. One pointed out that the ECtHR is not always in 
line with UN treaty bodies, with “one interpretation coming from Strasbourg and 
another from Geneva.” And now that the European Court of Justice is starting to 
develop its own human rights jurisprudence, there is the worry that the European 
bodies might diverge from one another as well. “We are at a turning point in 
relation to human rights protections,” this judge continued. “In the early 1990’s, 
there was enthusiasm for human rights not only in Europe but in other parts of 
the world. But now States are more reluctant and want a more limited 
interpretation of their human rights obligations under different treaties.” 
The session ended with reflections on what happens to human rights norms 
when there is an attempt to spread them universally. Several participants believed 
that, given wide disparities in cultural and social practices across the globe, the 
best one can expect from the international human rights system is the 
implementation of “the lowest common denominator.” The notion that States 
should be afforded a “margin of appreciation”—the doctrine developed through 
ECtHR case law that allows a local interpretation of international norms that 
takes into account cultural, historic and philosophical differences—further 
complicates the establishment of universal standards. 
BIIJ participants acknowledged that, in general, human rights standards tend 
to be higher when extended over geographically limited areas. As one judge 
expressed it, “If we leave human rights interpretation solely to international 
bodies, the result will be lower standards.” This idea notwithstanding, another 
judge observed that regional human rights bodies often set higher standards than 
those found at the level of their own Member States, despite the fact that the 
protection of human rights remains the duty of individual countries. He 
 
23. Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.), supra note 11; see also 
Hissène Habré v. Senegal, Decision No. ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/10, (Ct. of Justice of the Econ. Union of West Afr. 
States Nov. 18, 2010) [unofficial translation of the French original], available at http://www.hrw.org/en/habre-
case. 
24. See Barrios Altos v. Peru, Interpretation of the Judgment, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. c) No. 87 (Nov. 30, 
2001), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/C/83-ing.html. 
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concluded, “It is an illusion to believe that the human rights standards found at 
regional levels can be applied everywhere. It would take a long time to get 
there.” 
The opening session of BIIJ 2013 set the stage for subsequent discussions on the 
growing influence of human rights on legal thinking and practice across the 
globe, as well as on the work of international judges and their institutions. What 
became clear over the course of the discussion was that international courts and 
tribunals are not merely the beneficiaries of an increased worldwide awareness 
and appreciation of human rights. They are themselves important actors in the 
development and articulation of the human rights era that we live in today. Their 
influence may perhaps be best seen in the ever-increasing influence that these 
institutions exert over legal practice and procedures in the national sphere. 
Theme 2: The Impact of International Human Rights Norms at the National 
Level 
In a human rights era, States cannot operate in a national vacuum; they are 
increasingly called upon to heed international treaties and conventions to which 
they are parties and, more generally, to acknowledge and respond to a worldwide 
awareness of human rights and demands to protect these rights. BIIJ participants 
had the opportunity to discuss impacts at the domestic level of two international 
courts that are highly influential, if sometimes controversial, on human rights 
matters—the European Court of Human Rights and the International Criminal 
Court. The fact that many of the international judges at BIIJ 2013 had had prior 
domestic judicial experience made for an especially lively debate and exchange 
of experience. 
The Human Rights Experience in Europe and Other Regions 
In the first part of the session, participants were asked to consider the various 
complexities of interpreting and applying international human rights norms at the 
national level. It is clear that States are under an obligation to respect and ensure 
human rights and to provide an effective remedy to those claiming their rights 
have been violated.25 Even though States are expected to ensure there is 
normative harmony between human rights conventions and national law before 
ratification, experience shows that it is virtually impossible to discover all 
possible discrepancies through an abstract review. Individual cases or even 
general situations in a given country will inevitably lead to allegations that the 
conventions have been violated. 
 
25. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 2, Dec. 9, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 
available at http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx; European Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, arts. 1, 13, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 28 
15 
Although all branches of government have a responsibility to avoid human 
rights violations, an independent judiciary is indispensable to ensure that national 
legislation, regulations and decisions are in conformity with international and 
regional conventions. Incorporation of such conventions into domestic legislation 
is considered a particularly faithful method of their implementation; indeed, all 
47 Member States of the Council of Europe have now incorporated the European 
Convention. However, it is still not an easy task for national courts in Europe to 
lay down the Convention’s precise requirements. 
Participants were reminded that neither national societies nor international 
law are static, and it was suggested that human rights conventions be interpreted 
in an “evolutive” manner to reflect and correspond to changing circumstances. 
However, in Europe, such a dynamic approach must be balanced against the 
principle of subsidiarity, which limits the power of the European regional courts 
to situations where the action of individual countries proves insufficient. 
Furthermore, the concept of the margin of appreciation, as noted above, allows a 
State “a certain measure of discretion, subject to European supervision, when it 
takes legislative, administrative, or judicial action in the area of a Convention 
right.”26 A recurring theme in any discussion about the impact of international 
human rights norms at the national level is thus the important balancing act that 
must take place between regional and local practices and perspectives. 
In Europe, a State found responsible for a human rights violation may be 
required to respond in multiple ways: to award compensation for costs, as well as 
both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages to victims; to adopt discrete 
measures to comply with the judgment, for instance the reopening of a civil or 
criminal case at the national level; and to take general measures to stop 
continuing violations or prevent similar violations in the future. 
It was noted that this third element is particularly important if the number 
of repetitive cases before the ECtHR is to be reduced. At the moment, 10 States 
account for almost 80 percent of the Court’s workload, and many applications 
relate to issues where the Court has already found violations by the respondent 
State. A strategy adopted by the ECtHR to deal with large groups of identical 
cases that derive from the same underlying problem is that of “pilot judgments.”27 
It is critical that States that have not been parties to specific cases follow the case 
law nonetheless and adapt their legislation and practice in order to avoid similar 
violations. In other words, authoritative interpretations of human rights norms by 
the ECtHR affect all members of the Council of Europe. 
BIIJ participants had a number of reactions to the European experience with 
regard to the impact of human rights in the national domain. One European 
national laid out what he saw as the three reasons for the lack of implementation 
of European Convention norms at the domestic level: 1) the complexity of 
 
26. DAVID HARRIS ET. AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 11 (2d ed. 2009).  
27. See The Pilot-Judgment Procedure, EUR. CT. H.R., http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Pilot_ 
judgment_procedure_ENG.pdf. 
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implementation; 2) the lack of resources to make the necessary reforms; and 3) 
resistance by both executive and legislative bodies. One participant observed that 
the United Kingdom appears to have gone backwards, with the authorities 
exhibiting growing skepticism regarding the value of its membership in a larger 
Europe. “For most people, Brussels and Strasbourg are the same thing,” he 
added, suggesting that the distinction between the activities of the European 
Union and the Council of Europe—including the latter’s administration of the 
European Court of Human Rights—is a detail lost on the average citizen. 
The issue of norm implementation led to a discussion of the differences 
between monist and dualist States. It is clear that in dualist States, where 
international and national law are considered distinct and the former must be 
translated into the latter through a process of domestication, the implementation 
of human rights conventions may hit roadblocks. One judge described how the 
domestication issue in her country “is passed from hand to hand” within the 
government, with no one wishing to take the unpopular position of advocating 
for it. But this is starting to change, she added, “as we are getting more young, 
open-minded, and intelligent people now.” Another judge reminded the group 
that if an international treaty has been duly ratified by a State but not yet 
incorporated into domestic law, there is a presumption of that State’s intention to 
do so. 
Barriers to the implementation of regional human rights standards are not 
unique to dualist countries, however; a monist country may embrace international 
law as national law, but that does not necessarily mean that its practices 
automatically conform to the standards of an international or regional 
convention. Two judges from monist countries spoke, for example, of the 
reforms their judicial systems needed to undergo in order to comply with Article 
6 of the European Convention, which protects the right to a fair trial. 
The human rights situation in the Americas was then described. It was noted 
that in the constitutions of almost all Latin American countries, the protection of 
human rights is explicitly included as an obligation of the State. There is a lively 
judicial dialogue now between the IACtHR and the constitutional courts of its 
Member States, and national judges use the precedents of the IACtHR in their 
own judgments. In the local interpretation of standards, there is an important 
difference, one participant claimed, between the regional human rights systems in 
Europe and the Americas. There is no concept comparable to the margin of 
appreciation in the Inter-American system, he explained, suggesting that it was 
perhaps not necessary, given the cultural, religious and linguistic homogeneity 
characterizing the region. Another participant from Latin America disagreed with 
this assertion, however, saying that his own country “could not blindly accept a 
ruling of the Inter-American Court without taking the national system into 
account.” It was also noted that the Inter-American Court actively monitors the 
compliance of its Member States with the various provisions of its judgments, for 
example the criminal prosecution of those responsible for human rights violations 
or the awarding of reparations. 
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The third and most recent regional human rights system in the world is found 
on the African continent. One participant described how the still young ACtHPR 
has dealt with Member States whose practices are not in conformity with the 
provisions of the African Charter. For example, the Court recently ruled against 
Tanzania and ordered it to amend its constitution regarding the prohibition of 
independent candidature.28 It was observed that such a case “tests the waters” as 
regards the implementation of judgments at the national level. “We need 
executable judgments, with the measures to be taken clearly laid out,” said a 
participant. Subsequent monitoring of Member States’ compliance with ACtHPR 
judgments is the responsibility of the African Union Council of Ministers. This is 
another crucial part of the regional human rights enforcement system, and its 
efficacy will only be revealed in the coming years as the Court delivers more 
executable decisions. 
The group then turned to the role of judges—both domestic and 
international—in the establishment of human rights norms. This role should 
extend even to cases that are not specifically about human rights issues, argued 
one participant.  “We are duty-bound as judges to apply human rights norms even 
if they have not been raised.” He also identified judicial activism as an effective 
strategy when a State is reluctant to implement a convention to which it is a 
party. A second participant echoed this view—judges have duties as “State 
actors,” she asserted, and “we can contribute to what we see as the evolving 
interpretation of human rights, set the local process, and raise standards in terms 
of general acceptability.” She raised a caution about the fragmentation of norms, 
however, and suggested that judges use the interpretive rules in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties29 to aim toward harmonization. 
The point around which there was the most agreement, however, was how 
forcefully a lack of knowledge about human rights can impact conditions at the 
national level. One judge reported, “In my State there is a human rights charter, 
but judges don’t know about it.” Another participant spoke of his home country 
and its constitutional provisions that make both regional and international human 
rights law binding. “This places a huge burden on judges unless they are given 
specific human rights training,” he asserted. A judge hailing from Asia, a 
continent still without a regional human rights system, wondered how members 
of his national judiciary might learn about and possibly cite the jurisprudence of 
the ECtHR. 
But other participants were quick to point out that familiarity with human 
 
28. Tanganyika Law Society and the Legal and Human Rights Centre v. The United Republic of 
Tanzania, App. 009/2011, Afr. Ct. Hum. & Peoples’ Rts., Judgment (June 14, 2013), available at 
http://www.african-court.org/en/index.php/2-home/178-application-no-009-2011-tanganyika-law-society-and-
legal-and-human-rights-centre-v-the-united-republic-of-tanzania; Reverend Christopher R. Mtikila v. The 
United Republic of Tanzania, App. 011/2011, Afr. Ct. Hum. & Peolples’ Rts., Judgment (June 14, 2013), 
available at http://www.african-court.org/en/index.php/2-home/180-application-no-011-2011-rev-christopher-r-
mtikila-v-the-united-republic-of-tanzania. 
29. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.   
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rights law and international law more generally is becoming much more 
common. “Any newspaper in the world will have articles on human rights, while 
it was hardly mentioned in past decades,” observed a participant. Two judges 
used the same phrase, “a new generation of lawyers,” when speaking about the 
young practitioners, knowledgeable about human rights, who are currently 
joining the profession. This is what is needed, declared a human rights judge; 
“the whole legal society needs to contribute” to the human rights era. 
As the first part of this discussion wound down, one participant returned to 
the challenges to human rights implementation cited earlier. Delays in 
implementation, lack of resources for reforms, and other essentially 
“bureaucratic” issues can be solved, he maintained. The most difficult challenge 
remains lack of political will at the national level. However, he observed, 
improvements in education may in turn help to demystify the place of human 
rights in contemporary life and allay hostility toward the international and 
regional systems established to protect these rights. 
The Impact of the International Criminal Court 
Participants then moved on to the topic of the ICC and its effects on the 
domestic law and practice of States. It was pointed out that the Court’s work is 
intrinsically linked to international human rights norms because of the nature of 
its mandate; as the Appeals Chamber has stated, “[h]uman rights underpin the 
[Rome] Statute; every aspect of it” (see text box, page 19). The ICC regimes 
related to complementarity and cooperation have perhaps the most potential to 
impact activities taking place at the national level. 
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Excerpt from ICC judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo 
against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the 
Court pursuant to Article 19(2)(a) of the Rome Statute.* 
“Article 21 (3) of the Statute stipulates that the law applicable under the 
Statute must be interpreted as well as applied in accordance with 
internationally recognized human rights. Human rights underpin the Statute; 
every aspect of it, including the exercise of the jurisdiction of the Court. Its 
provisions must be interpreted and more importantly applied in accordance 
with internationally recognized human rights; first and foremost, in the 
context of the Statute, the right to a fair trial,** a concept broadly perceived 
and applied, embracing the judicial process in its entirety.” 
* Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, 
Judgment ¶ 37 (14 Dec. 2006) 
** Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court, art. 64 (2), 67 (1), 68 (1) 
and (5), Rome Statute. See note 33. 
 
The “complementarity principle” of the ICC—the foundational notion that it 
acts as a court of “last resort” and will step in only if national jurisdictions have 
failed to address international crimes—has encouraged many States to make 
changes to their domestic penal codes, fair trial guarantees, and applicable 
penalties so as to conform to the Rome Statute. Such changes will allow States to 
challenge the admissibility of cases before the ICC by demonstrating that 
prosecutions can effectively take place domestically. As the ICC is still a 
relatively new institution, much of the admissibility test remains unclear, 
although admissibility challenges have already arisen in relation to Libya, Kenya 
and other situations. 
While certain aspects of the Court’s jurisprudence may still be crystallizing, 
it is already a fait accompli that the ICC has inspired changes in national law 
around the globe. It was observed that a number of States—including Australia, 
South Africa, and the United Kingdom—have now directly incorporated the 
crimes outlined in the Rome Statute into their domestic law. The crime in the 
Rome Statute that has likely precipitated the most amendments to national 
legislation is crimes against humanity, contained in Article 7 of the Statute. 
While the underlying acts that constitute a crime against humanity, such as 
murder or rape, have long been defined as criminal in national jurisdictions, they 
have not been classified as crimes against humanity per se. Incorporating this 
new class of crimes assigns them a stigma commensurate with their gravity. 
Some States—including Estonia, Germany and Spain—have even gone beyond 
the Rome Statute by removing the State or organization policy requirement for 
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crimes against humanity, an element required by the Rome Statute but not by the 
ICTY or ICTR.30 
War crimes, on the other hand, have been more commonly criminalized in 
domestic legal systems, though some countries have made new legal provisions 
for these crimes following the Rome Statute as well. Japan is an example of a 
country that had particular difficulty with the war crimes provisions of the Rome 
Statute. Because the Japanese Constitution states that “the Japanese people 
forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of 
force as means of settling international disputes,”31 the State was prevented from 
enacting any legislation whatsoever related to war or war crimes. Japan 
subsequently adopted several pieces of emergency legislation to incorporate 
international humanitarian law into its legal system before it acceded to the Rome 
Statue on 17 July 2007.32 
The requirement for States Parties to cooperate fully with the ICC in the 
investigation and prosecution of crimes within its jurisdiction33 has also 
impacted the domestic law of many nations, as they ensure that their legal 
systems are capable of responding to any request for cooperation that the Court 
may make. An example is the ICC’s power to have nationals surrendered to the 
Court, provided under Article 89 of the Rome Statute. Prior to ratification, many 
States had total bans on extraditing nationals. Now, many countries—including 
Belgium, Finland, Germany, Norway and Slovenia—have changed existing laws 
to allow for extradition of nationals if an international treaty requires it.34 Other 
States have not gone as far, only making provision for extradition to the ICC as 
an exception to what remains a general prohibition on national extradition.35 
  
 
30. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23& IT-96-23/1, Judgment on Appeal, ¶ 98 n. 114 (June 12, 
2002), http://www.icty.org/case/kunarac/4; Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-30-A, Judgment on 
Appeal, ¶ 269 (May 20, 2005), http://www.unictr.org/Cases/tabid/127/PID/41/default.aspx?id=5&mnid=4. 
31.  NIHONKOKU KENP  [KENP ] CONSTITUTION, art. 9 (Japan). 
32. Jens Meierhenrich & Keiko Ko, How Do States Join the International Criminal Court? The 
Implementation of the Rome Statute in Japan, 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 233, 237-41 (2009). 
33. UN General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 3, art. 86, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/add16852-aee9-4757-abe7-9cdc7cf02886/ 
283503/romestatuteng1.pdf. 
34. Matthias Goldmann, Implementing the Rome Statute in Europe: From Sovereign Distinction to 
Convergence in International Criminal Law?, (2005/2008)16 FINNISH Y.B INT’L L. 5 (July 27, 2007), available 
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1348698.  
35. Id.  
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Article 27 of Rome Statute: Irrelevance of official capacity 
 
1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on 
official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or 
Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative 
or a government official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal 
responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground 
for reduction of sentence. 
 
The immunity of certain national officials from prosecution, found in the 
laws of many countries, has also been affected by ratification of the Rome 
Statute. While most nations have retained such immunities, Article 27 of the 
Statute requires that such immunities shall not serve as a bar to an ICC 
prosecution (see text box above). The ICC can thus enforce criminal law in 
situations in which certain national jurisdictions would not be able to prosecute 
an accused. The ICC has not always had a positive experience in this area, 
however, especially with the arrest warrant issued for Sudanese President Omar 
al Bashir. Although Sudan is not a Party to the Rome Statute, it became subject 
to investigation by referral of the Darfur situation to the ICC through a Chapter 
VII resolution of the UN Security Council.36 
Without its own police force, the ICC is dependent upon the cooperation of 
national law enforcement systems to execute its arrest warrants. The cooperation 
obligation of States Parties notwithstanding, Chad and Malawi both allowed 
President Al-Bashir onto their territory without arresting him. The States were 
subsequently referred to the UN Security Council for non-cooperation, and their 
actions were also the subject of an ICC ruling on whether Head of State 
immunity—specifically referenced in Article 98 of the Rome Statute (see 
sidebar, page 22)—applies when the ICC issues an arrest warrant against a sitting 
Head of State from a non-State Party. In a controversial ruling, Pre-trial Chamber 
I held that there is an exception to Head of State immunity under customary 
international law when an international court seeks arrest for an international 
crime. Malawi and Chad were thus not allowed to rely on Mr. Al-Bashir’s Head 
of State immunity when the ICC sought his arrest for crimes against humanity, 
war crimes, and genocide.37 
 
36. Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad Harun, Case No. ICC -02/05-01/07, Warrant of Arrest, (Apr. 27, 
2007), http://www.icccpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200205/ 
related%20cases/icc%200205%200107/court%20records/chambers/pre%20trial%20chamber%20i/Pages/warra
nt%20of%20arrest%20for%20ahmad%20harun.aspx (case concerning an international arrest warrant issued by 
a Belgium investigating magistrate against the incumbent Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Congo citing grave 
breaches of the Geneva Convention); see also S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005), available 
at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1593(2005) (adopting resolution to refer the 
Situation in Darfur, Sudan with 11 votes in favor). 
37. Prosecutor v. Ahmed Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09), Decision on Cooperation with the Court 
(December 12, 2011), http://www.icccpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation 
%20icc%200205/related%20cases/icc02050109/court%20records/chambers/ptci/Pages/139.aspx; Prosecutor v. 
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Finally, it was noted that non-States Parties do not have to be the subject of 
an ICC investigation in order for the Court’s work to influence their actions. The 
United States demonstrated this when, in 2013, a Congolese suspect wanted by 
the ICC, Bosco Ntaganda, surrendered himself at the US embassy in Rwanda. 
Despite not being formally obligated to surrender Mr. Ntaganda to the Court, the 
US worked with the ICC and Dutch and Rwandan authorities to secure his 
transfer to The Hague. 
Participants had a number of queries and comparisons about 
complementarity and cooperation, from the perspective of both their home 
countries and their respective judicial institutions. Several related how their 
governments had responded to the need to change their criminal and procedural 
codes so as to implement the Rome Statute domestically. One judge recounted 
that his government had charged three soldiers with crimes that it thought might 
fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC, in order to preempt the ICC from opening 
an investigation. However, the cases came under domestic military jurisdiction 
and the military code had not been amended to conform to the Rome Statute, so 
the soldiers were ultimately released. Another participant suggested that the ICC 
ruling about exceptions to Head of State immunity for international crimes 
represents a new interpretation of customary international law and, notably, is not 
“in sync” with the 2012 ICJ judgment in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State.38 
 
Article 98 of Rome Statute: Cooperation with respect to waiver of 
immunity and consent to surrender 
1. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance 
which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its 
obligations under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic 
immunity of a person or property of a third State, unless the Court can 
first obtain the cooperation of that third State for the waiver of the 
immunity. 
 
 
  
 
Ahmed Al Bashir Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on Cooperation with the Court, (December 13, 2011), 
http://www.icccpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200205/related%2
0cases/icc02050109/court%20records/chambers/ptci/Pages/140.aspx. 
38. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece intervening), Judgment (Feb. 3, 2012), 
available at http://www.icjcij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&case=143&p3=4; but see Dem. Rep. of 
Congo v. Belg., Arrest Warrant of Apr. 11, 2000 (Feb. 14, 2002), para. 61, available at http://www.icjcij.org/ 
docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&k=36&case=121&code=cobe&p3=4 (ICJ noted that immunity questions may 
be resolved differently when the matters are before international criminal courts). 
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Several participants alluded to the situation of former Chadian dictator 
Hissène Habré, whose prosecution became the subject of multiple judicial fora 
before Senegal—Habré’s country of residence since 1990—finally committed in 
2012 to prosecute him in a special ad hoc tribunal of an international character, to 
be established within the Senegalese judiciary.39 It was noted that the ICJ 
judgment that dealt with Belgium’s proposal to prosecute Habré under universal 
jurisdiction took into consideration Senegal’s obligation to comply with the UN 
Convention against Torture, which it had ratified. Just as ratification of the Rome 
Statute implies obligations by States Parties, it was incumbent upon Senegal to 
prosecute someone charged with torture, or else extradite him to a country that 
would do so.40 
A comparison of the approaches of the ICTR and the ICC in the area of 
complementarity and cooperation then followed. One participant pointed out that 
the ICTR did not establish complementarity with the Rwandan judicial system so 
that prosecutions related to the Rwandan Genocide could be directed at all ethnic 
groups, something that the national courts were unlikely to do. Another judge 
concurred, saying, “Rwanda was not ready to prosecute a large part of the 
nation.” In terms of national cooperation in cases concerning international 
crimes, the situation of a Swedish national suspected of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity during the Rwandan genocide was raised. Rwanda asked for the 
suspect to be extradited and the Swedish Supreme Court approved the 
extradition. After the ruling, however, the suspect appealed this decision to the 
ECtHR, claiming he would not receive a fair trial in Rwanda. While his case was 
pending, the ECtHR ordered the suspect released. By the time Strasbourg 
ultimately ruled that the Rwandan judiciary appeared to be independent and that 
the extradition could proceed, the suspect had left Swedish territory.41 
The situation of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) was also brought 
into the discussion. The Tribunal was created to try the individuals accused of 
carrying out a 2005 Beirut attack which killed 23 persons, including former 
Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, and injured many others, as well as to try 
other cases relevant to that attack.  At the same time, Lebanese authorities also 
have potential jurisdiction over crimes related to the 2005 attack. If the STL 
chose to exercise its own jurisdiction over those crimes, it would ask Lebanon to 
defer to the tribunal, as articulated in an agreement between the United Nations 
and Lebanon and given effect by a resolution of the Security Council.42 As to the 
 
39. See World Court: Important Victory for Habré Victims, FIDH, http://www.fidh.org/en/africa/Chad/ 
Hissene-Habre-Case/World-Court-Important-Victory-for 
40. Press Release, I.C.J., Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.) 
(July 12, 2012), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=1&case=144&code=bs&p3=6. For more 
about the case, read the BIIJ 2012 report at http://www.brandeis.edu/ethics/pdfs/internationaljustice/ 
biij/BIIJ2012.pdf. 
41. Ahorugeze v. Sweden, App. No. 37075/09, Eur. Ct. H.R., Judgment (Oct. 27, 2011), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-107183. 
42. S.C. Res. 1757, U.N. Doc S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007).  
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cooperation necessary to investigate the crimes in question, the STL issued 
warrants for four accused persons in 2011, requesting the assistance of authorities 
including Interpol to determine their whereabouts. As of 2014, the accused are 
still at large and their trials began, in absentia, in January 2014. 
The discussion ended with a question about the alleged bias that many 
observers—including, notably the African Union—believe the ICC has toward 
pursuing cases in Africa. There continues to be talk about creating a war crimes 
chamber to exist alongside the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights so 
that the kinds of African cases currently on the docket of the ICC can be carried 
out in Africa instead. One African judge observed grimly, “Africa is just not 
interested in complementarity with the ICC.” Indeed, the current hostility toward 
the ICC exhibited by many African States Parties was seen as a regrettable 
development by several participants. A European judge observed, however, that 
the current African focus of the Court does suggest a kind of neocolonial 
paternalism. He consequently thought it a good idea that the ICC hold some of its 
Africa-related trials in situ. 
Although this session began with a focus on two important courts and their 
impacts at the national level, the conversation quickly branched out to cover 
various ways in which human rights norms and the international jurisprudence 
developed around them have served to push a domestic human rights agenda in a 
number of States. At the same time, it is clear that many impediments to the full 
realization of the human rights era continue to exist across the globe. 
Theme 3: How Universal Are Human Rights? 
Next, BIIJ participants stepped back from considering the practical aspects of 
how human rights influence their institutions and judicial practice and reflected 
on the fundamental nature of these rights. More particularly, judges focused on 
an important but elusive question concerning human rights—to what extent can 
they be considered universal? 
The conversation began with a reminder of how universality is addressed in 
basic human rights instruments. According to the United Nations Charter, the 
organization shall promote, inter alia, “universal respect for, and observance of, 
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language or religion.”43 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights44 was 
proclaimed by the UN General Assembly in 1948 as a “common standard of 
achievement for all peoples and all nations,” the objective being to secure the 
“universal and effective” recognition of and observance for the rights and 
freedoms recognised therein. As “all human beings are born free and equal in 
dignity and rights,” the rights and freedoms set forth in the Declaration belong to 
 
43. U.N. Charter, art. 55. 
44. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UNDR]. 
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“everyone” (see text box below).45 
 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights* 
 
Article 1: 
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are 
endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a 
spirit of brotherhood. 
Article 2: 
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on 
the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country 
or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-
self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty. 
(emphasis added) 
 
* Supra note 44. 
 
It was noted that in international human rights parlance it has become 
commonplace to state that human rights are “universal, indivisible and 
interdependent and interrelated.” This quotation stems from the Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted by consensus by the World 
Conference on Human Rights on 25 June 1993.46 As to universality in particular, 
the Vienna Declaration states that the universal nature of all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all “is beyond question.”47 The universal nature of 
human rights continues to be mentioned almost routinely in resolutions adopted 
by the UN General Assembly, the UN Human Rights Council and other 
international and regional bodies.48 Many assert that the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights expresses general principles that have become binding under 
customary international law.49 
The principles of the Universal Declaration have since been reaffirmed and 
 
45. UDHR, Preamble & arts 1-2. 
46. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, G.A. Res. 48/121, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 
(June 25, 1993) (hereinafter Vienna Declaration).  
47. Vienna Declaration, ¶ 1. 
48. See, e.g., UN General Assembly resolution 67/169 (Enhancement of international cooperation in the 
field of human rights), adopted without a vote on 20 December 2012 (affirming guiding principle of 
universality). G.A. Res. 67/169, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/67/169 (Dec. 20, 2012). 
49. On the status and interpretation of the Universal Declaration, see for example The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights: A Common Standard of Achievement (Guðmundur S. Alfreðsson & Asbjørn 
Eide  eds.,1999).  
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developed in numerous global human rights conventions. Some of the core 
conventions today command something close to universal adherence. The 
number of Contracting Parties to the Convention on the Rights of the Child is 
193. There are 187 to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women, and 176 to the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.50  Even the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights has attracted a fairly high number of 
ratifications or accessions at 167 (without China or Saudi Arabia among the 
group). The number of Contracting Parties to the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is a bit lower at 161 (and does not include 
the United States). 
It can be asked to what extent a particular substantive right—or rather the 
specific content the right has received in a human rights convention—has 
achieved universal acceptance.  However, while a large number of States are still 
formulating reservations or are unwilling to submit themselves to mechanisms of 
individual complaints, it is, as stated in the Vienna Declaration, “beyond 
question” that the very principle of universality has attracted universal 
endorsement. This phenomenon can be called “international legal universality.”51 
When looked at historically, the picture is rather different. The idea of 
universally recognized individual human rights is of recent origin. And while 
most States today pay at least lip service to this idea, it is clear that the actual 
application and interpretation of the rights recognised under various human rights 
declarations and conventions, and thus the reality on the ground, represent a wide 
spectrum of approaches. 
It was pointed out that some national practices are presented overtly as 
applications and interpretations of a given right. Examples include the death 
penalty—which some countries claim does not constitute an infringement on the 
right to life—and significant restrictions on freedom of speech, assembly and 
association, which may be lawful in countries with widespread censorship, 
prohibition against unauthorized demonstrations, or single political parties. 
Other national practices take place covertly, without the government or regime 
in power arguing that such practices do not, in fact, violate human rights. The 
most obvious example is the widespread use of torture. Such practices should be 
given much less legal interpretative relevance, if any. 
That human rights, which are in principle universal, may receive widely 
divergent applications and interpretations in different countries and regions is 
often linked to the idea of cultural relativity and diversity. While cultural 
diversity does not in itself pose a challenge to the principle of universality—in 
fact, respect for cultural diversity is a human right52 —cultural relativity is 
 
50. Status of Ratification of Human Rights Instruments as of February 13, 2013, United Nations, 
www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/HumanRightsBodies.aspx. 
51. Jack Donnelly, The Relative Universality of Human Rights, 29 Hum. Rts. Q. 281, 288 (2007). 
52. See, eg., G.A. Res. 67/169, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/67/169 (Dec. 20, 2012) (referring to an 
Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 28 
27 
sometimes presented as a factor explaining and justifying different approaches to, 
and interpretations of, internationally recognised human rights. This may be the 
idea behind a reference in a recent UN General Assembly human rights 
resolution to the need to take into account not only the duty of all States to 
promote and protect all human rights but also “the significance of national and 
regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious 
backgrounds.” (This may explain why the vote on that resolution was far from 
unanimous.53) In the same vein, the Human Rights Declaration of the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations of November 2012 states that the realisation of 
human rights “must be considered in the regional and national context bearing in 
mind different political, economic, legal, social, cultural, historical and religious 
backgrounds.”54 
BIIJ participants offered many comments about the universality of human 
rights. In particular, the role of cultural diversity in the debate over universality, 
and the evocation of diversity by some States as a justification for not respecting 
certain rights, provoked a number of questions. One participant asked 
hypothetically, “If you oppose the notion that all human rights are universal, 
which ones would you be willing to give up? Would you accept arbitrary arrest? 
No freedom of speech? If put this way, I am convinced that everyone will accept 
the universality issue.” Another participant objected to that formulation of the 
question, however. “The question instead should be, ‘Which restrictions are you 
prepared to accept to protect cultural traditions?’ If put that way, the answer 
might be very different.” 
These views led to a consideration of different levels of rights: those that 
might be considered absolute, such as the right to life and the right to be free 
from torture or slavery, compared to those that might be interpreted in a more 
relative light, such as certain rights of the family and the freedom of assembly. 
One participant who had been involved in the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) noted that although violence against 
women is often defended as a part of traditional culture, all parties to the 
CEDAW convention are obligated to report on this phenomenon in their 
countries. Thus, the “cultural diversity card” cannot be played in all situations. A 
criminal judge with substantial human rights experience observed that the 
freedom from rape and other forms of sexual violence is on its way to becoming 
an “absolute right.” He continued, “There is an increasing trend to single out 
specific crimes from the broad category of crimes against humanity and to regard 
them as independent international crimes. Genocide was the first one, as of the 
 
international order based on, inter alia, ‘respect for cultural diversity and universal human rights’) . See also 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 27, Dec. 9, 1996, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (reaffirming the 
rights of persons belonging to  minorities to enjoy their own culture). 
53. G.A. Res. 67/175, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/67/175 (Dec. 20, 2012) (adopted by a vote of 126 votes in 
favour, 53 votes against and six abstentions). 
54. ASEAN Declaration of Human Rights, ¶ 7, (Nov. 19, 2012), available at http://www.asean. 
org/news/asean-statement-communiques/item/asean-human-rights-declaration.  
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1948 Convention, and torture—which may be a crime against humanity as well 
as a war crime—is frequently identified as an independent international crime. It 
may well be that rape and sex crimes more generally will follow the same path.” 
Such trends notwithstanding, States continue to submit reservations to human 
rights treaties, arguing that these reservations reflect national or regional 
particularities, or local practices and beliefs. These reservations frequently come 
from States with “conservative” social and religious beliefs, such as Islamic 
countries that wish to reconcile their human rights obligations with provisions of 
Sharia law, or African countries that reject the rights of homosexuals. But 
Western countries submit reservations as well; one participant noted that both 
Sweden and Finland made a reservation to Article 20 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which prohibits propaganda for war, 
declaring that it was contrary to the freedom of expression, a right considered 
fundamental in those two countries.55 
The idea of reservations to human rights treaties was then explored in more 
depth. It was agreed that “sweeping reservations” cannot be allowed, and that 
reservations should furthermore not be contrary to the object and purpose of the 
treaty in question, as articulated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.56 But who should decide what is contrary and what is not? And what 
should be the place of customary international law in this determination? It was 
pointed out that the ICJ addressed the issue of treaty reservations in an early 
advisory opinion,57 but some participants felt that turning to the Court for its 
pronouncement on every reservation to a human rights treaty would not be an 
efficient way to proceed. On the other hand, argued one judge, the ICJ is a 
judicial organ that by definition represents the principal legal systems of the 
world,58 and furthermore ensures a balanced global representation on its bench.  
As such the ICJ may offer the best chance of determining what kinds of human 
rights may really hold universal status and thus not be subject to reservations. 
The discussion came around once again to the ECtHR principle of “the 
margin of appreciation,” which, in the thinking of scholar Jack Donnelly, is not 
incompatible with the idea of “the relative universality of internationally 
recognized human rights.” 59 Donnelly has articulated a three-tiered scheme for 
thinking about this idea: there are 1) broad human rights concepts, that have 2) 
 
55. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 9, 1996, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, available at 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg_no=iv-4&chapter=4&lang=en . 
56. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 29.  
57. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
Advisory Opinion, at 15, 24 (May 28, 1951), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2= 
4&k=90 &case=12&code=ppcg&p3=4. 
58. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 9: “At every election, the electors shall bear in mind 
not only that the persons to be elected should individually possess the qualifications required, but also that in 
the body as a whole the representation of the main forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems of the 
world should be assured.” 
59. Donnelly, supra note 51. 
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multiple defensible conceptions, which in turn will have 3) many defensible 
implementations.60 Donnelly notes that a wide range of practices found in 
different countries, regions, and cultures can be consistent with underlying 
human rights concepts around which there is universal consensus.61  One 
European judge concurred with Donnelly’s thinking about diverse practices and 
suggested that the margin of appreciation is “a good tool for fostering dialogue 
between international and national regimes.” He added that the human rights 
cases around the right of Muslim women in Europe to wear the burqa,62 for 
example, will push both judges and the general populace to consider cultural 
relativism when thinking about unfamiliar practices. A second European judge 
added a note of caution, however: “The margin of appreciation has limits—it can 
go to a certain point but cannot nullify the right itself; there is still a universal 
part of rights that cannot be restricted by the margin of appreciation.” 
A criminal judge noted that it is important to move beyond the language of 
legal instruments and look at what is happening on the ground when evaluating 
the status of so-called universal rights, relative or not. There is a difference, she 
asserted, “between the practical universality of human rights and the universal 
condemnation of a wrong.” She continued, “If you had access to confidential 
information, you might find that as a practicality there is no universal 
abandonment of torture despite almost universal condemnation.” 
Several participants were eager to identify sources showing that, as one judge 
expressed it, “there are universal aspirations toward human rights in all kinds of 
traditions and cultures.” The Bible, Qur’an, Torah, and Rig Veda were all 
suggested as sources, as were texts associated with Buddhism and Confucianism. 
The concept underlying all of these, some asserted, is human dignity. One judge 
remained skeptical about citing religious texts in this context, however, arguing 
“they have been used to throw up barriers to human rights, and are in many ways 
inconsistent with human rights.” 
The conversation then turned to the situation of indigenous peoples. One 
judge queried, “how will the push to universalize human rights affect indigenous 
traditions that some countries want to preserve?” This issue is particularly salient 
in Latin America, where a large number of recognized indigenous groups have 
expressed an interest in applying their customary law, which is not always in line 
with accepted human rights norms. For example, the kind of defense afforded to 
accused persons in indigenous community justice procedures, or the types of 
punishment meted out to those found guilty, may not satisfy international norms. 
Some countries in that region insist that customary law must abide by the 
standards established by the Inter-American human rights system; other countries 
 
60. Id. at 299. 
61. Id. at 300. 
62. Relinquishment to the Grand Chamber of a case concerning the wearing of the the full-face veil in 
public places in France (S.A.S. v. France), App. No. 43835/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Apr. 11, 2011), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/fra/pages/search.aspx?i=001-110063#{“itemid”:[“001-110063”]}. 
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are leaving the decision up to national courts on a case-by-case basis. The 
question underlying this dilemma, one participant suggested, is “what should be 
the limits of legal pluralism?” Another participant suggested that the best 
solution might be for Latin American countries to ratify human rights treaties and 
simply make reservations concerning the rights of indigenous peoples. 
The discussion ended by returning to the topic of the domestication of human 
rights treaties, and how to overcome the resistance of some States to incorporate 
treaty provisions into domestic law. One participant described the situation in 
Australia, where the government has signed all major conventions but is a “serial 
non-implementer.” He recounted how, in the context of a federation, the different 
Australian states are able to strongly assert their own legal position. For example, 
the Australian state of Victoria has circumvented the federal government’s 
inaction by passing state legislation that obliges its local courts to apply the 
provisions of conventions that the Australian government has signed but not 
brought into domestic law. 
Several European judges reported that membership in the Council of Europe 
has required States to implement the provisions of the European Convention on 
Human Rights at the domestic level, giving a bill of rights for the first time to 
some countries, including the United Kingdom. However, incorporation of the 
European Convention does not necessarily mean that legal specialists recognize 
or apply its provisions. A participant reported that the Convention has been part 
of Swedish legislation since 1996 but that this fact remains unknown to many of 
the country’s practicing lawyers. 
Finally, two African judges reiterated the continuing challenges faced on their 
home continent regarding the incorporation of international human rights 
conventions into domestic law. They felt that much capacity building needed to 
take place so that implementing legislation could be passed. They furthermore 
expressed the hope that international and regional courts could assist with this 
capacity building and persuade national leaders to fulfil their States’ obligations 
vis-à-vis international human rights norms, even if these are interpreted according 
to local cultures and beliefs. 
Theme 4: The Role of State Engagement and Diplomacy in International 
Justice 
Fiat iustitia, pereat mundus. 
–Let there be justice, though the world perish (attributed to Holy Roman 
Emperor Ferdinand I) 
The role of politics in international justice has been a recurring topic of 
discussion at the Brandeis Institute for International Judges over the years, and 
the 2013 session was no exception. Participants were challenged to consider how 
their institutions should act, and how they as judges should respond, when 
Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 28 
31 
confronted with the demands of realpolitik. A number of issues were raised, in 
particular in relation to international criminal courts and tribunals, although other 
types of jurisdictions in the international sphere may also find themselves subject 
to external pressures from States and diplomatic processes. The underlying 
question addressed during the discussion was evoked by the Latin motto cited 
above—should justice be carried out at all costs? 
It is clear that all international courts and tribunals work in political contexts 
and that many judgments have direct or indirect political consequences. But it is 
also assumed that judges will interpret the law as it stands, leaving political 
considerations aside. One participant with diplomatic experience played devil’s 
advocate, posing some provocative questions. Is strict detachment from politics a 
realistic approach on the part of judges in all circumstances? And will remaining 
above the political fray lead to the increased legitimacy of international courts, or 
might it instead undermine their authority? 
These questions were particularly pertinent to the ICC, which has been 
confronted several times with the “peace vs. justice” conundrum—in Uganda, 
Sudan, and Libya—and been criticized for proceeding with prosecutions despite 
the claim that the proceedings would worsen conditions on the ground. It was 
asserted that the ICC has also weakened its own appearance of authority by bringing 
to trial political leaders in Kenya who were recently elected, and thus clearly enjoy 
popular support at home. A similar situation would arise, it was suggested, should 
the ICC undertake to prosecute the “winner” of an armed conflict where the military 
victory has been reached through alleged war crimes, as in Sri Lanka. 
Given that the ICC depends on the cooperation of its States Parties, as 
mentioned above, and that this cooperation has been difficult to enforce in some 
instances, the following queries were made: 
$ Is it wise for the ICC to initiate investigations at all when one can see 
from the very beginning that the State concerned will not hand over a 
suspect to The Hague within the foreseeable future? 
$ Should the Court take action only when there are realistic prospects of 
having an arrest warrant executed? 
$ Is it at all realistic to initiate an investigation against a Head of State 
who is still in office when there are no signs there will be a change of 
government? 
$ Is it appropriate to initiate an investigation in the context of ongoing 
conflict when the suffering of a civilian population might be exacerbated 
or prolonged by such an investigation? 
$ And the question underlying all of the foregoing ones: is it legitimate 
for the Court to take such considerations into account? 
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One of the solutions proposed to these challenges was to improve 
communication between the ICC and the UN Security Council. This would 
allow the Court, for example, to seek the assistance of the Council in the 
execution of arrest warrants, especially if the suspected criminals are in 
positions of power. Dialogue between the Court and the States involved in 
investigations should also be enhanced. A former diplomat made this 
suggestion: “The Court should perhaps be encouraged to act as a diplomatic 
player, at least until the stage of prosecution. That way, there could be a 
discussion of the timing of investigations and the political consequences that 
could be expected from a trial.” 
Participants had a number of reactions to these questions and viewpoints, as 
well as numerous experiences to bring to the discussion. A judge from Latin 
America commented on the dangers of international intervention, pointing out 
that many observers are concerned about the potential impacts on the ongoing 
conflict in Colombia of an ICC investigation. “How can the war end when the 
same persons who would sign the peace agreement are those who expect to be 
accused of war crimes by the Court?” Such impacts by the ICC might be 
exacerbated by rulings of the Inter-American Court, which have made clear that 
no amnesty for serious humanitarian crimes will be permissible in Member 
States. 
One participant felt very strongly that hesitation to act on the part of the ICC 
carries its own risks. “The moment you let a perpetrator off the hook, you have 
created another perpetrator,” he insisted. “If the prosecutor does not intervene, 
then we encourage new war criminals.” A criminal judge suggested that the 
question of whether or not to start an investigation or indict an individual is not 
the primary one; it is instead the timing of the action that is critical. Another 
criminal judge pointed out that the deterrence effect of international prosecutions 
is not, in fact, knowable. 
On the subject of cooperation between international courts and government 
authorities, a former international prosecutor acknowledged that such 
cooperation is inevitable, but also that “discussions in dark corners can be a 
recipe for rumor.” Any communication with States involved in international 
investigations and prosecutions should thus be out in the open. A former criminal 
tribunal president concurred, observing that consultations with governments are 
necessary but should take place with the utmost transparency, which includes 
keeping fellow members of the bench informed. He contrasted, however, 
communication about administrative issues with communication concerning an 
individual case or trial; on the latter, “everyone agrees there will be no 
intervention or communication whatsoever.” Protecting the integrity of 
international courts in this area is critical, he added, as “their lifespan is shorter 
than that of national courts.” A current tribunal president added his voice to the 
discussion, observing that “a political reality is there, and one cannot be oblivious 
to it. But at the same time, one cannot sell one’s soul. Anything that could reflect 
on my role or that of my judges, I will not deal with but leave it to another 
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official.” 
The conversation then moved to the topic of funding for international courts 
and tribunals and the contact with political entities that is sometimes necessary in 
order for institutions to ensure a stable financial base.  Judges serving on courts 
that depend entirely upon voluntary contributions reported the most difficulty 
balancing the need to engage with States to garner support with the need to resist 
pressure from those States. “A number of donors have attempted to use their 
funding to control outcomes,” recounted a judge. “They have said that they are 
happy for some cases to proceed but not others. I find this quite reprehensible; 
you either bring the court to a close in a transparent manner or support it until the 
end. The judges at my court feel threatened by this development.” The judge of 
another donor-supported court reported that, at one point, the financial situation 
in her institution was so dire that it could not go on without an immediate influx 
of cash. She made over 100 diplomatic calls, pleading for support, although in 
the end it was the UN that stepped in to help. “If there is any lesson to learn 
here,” the judge concluded, “it is never to have donor-funded courts!” 
The contrast between donor-supported courts and those set up with regular 
sources of funding was marked. The IACtHR receives almost half of its funding 
from European States that have no involvement in cases before the court, so there 
is little fear of political intervention from those donors. It does, however, run on a 
proverbial shoestring. ITLOS is afforded a sufficient annual budget with little 
room for extras, the group heard. But this does not stop some States from 
pressuring the Tribunal to make further cuts. The Caribbean Court of Justice 
(CCJ) is perhaps most insulated from undue interference, as it receives all its 
funding from a trust fund established by member States of the Caribbean 
Community. Consequently, the Court has no need to interact with governments 
on budgetary matters. Finally, it was observed that the kinds of problems 
described during this session—both of financing and political interference—
simply do not exist in relation to the ICJ. “The ICJ is fortunate to have a long 
tradition and a special place in the international community, which does not wish 
to interfere,” remarked a participant. 
Two recommendations were made at the close of the discussion. The first is 
for international courts and tribunals to make formal provisions in their rules for 
consulting with governments on non-confidential matters. The second 
recommendation is for courts to be fully aware of the political context in which 
they are working. “In conflicts between law and politics,” a participant declared, 
“it is almost always politics that comes out the winner. This is true not only in 
the international political arena but also at the national level. I am aware that 
judges do not like to hear this, but it is a fact that we have to accept.” 
Theme 5: The Future of International Courts and Tribunals: What 
Developments and Models Will We See in 20 Years? 
The world is witnessing an important time in the life of international courts 
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and tribunals. Some, such as the ad hoc criminal tribunals, are closing. Others, 
such as the ICJ and WTO AB, are seeing an increase in both the number and 
types of cases brought before them.  At the same time, national jurisdictions are 
gaining capacity to handle international law issues. The impact of human rights 
and the impact on human rights are a significant part of these developments. 
The final plenary session asked participants to reflect on the direction the 
international justice system is taking and should be taking as it seeks to create a 
more just world. This topic is particularly pertinent now, with much scholarly 
and civil society attention being paid to the legacy of the ICTY, ICTR, and the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) as they complete their mandates and 
transition into their so-called “residual mechanisms.” Judges from those courts 
and others with limited jurisdictions—namely the ECCC and STL—are perhaps 
particularly aware of what their institutions have (and have not) been able to 
accomplish, and what long-term effects their jurisprudence may have on 
international law. All international judges, however, are regularly confronted 
with questions concerning the effectiveness and relevance of their institutions. 
This session provided a framework to discuss issues critical to their future 
development and ultimate success. 
Taking Stock 
The conversation began with an acknowledgment of some of the achievements 
and challenges of the ad hoc tribunals. “The ICTY and ICTR signaled the end of 
the notion of impunity,” declared a participant. And they also filled in the vacuum 
left by the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals by providing “a corpus of procedural 
and evidentiary law, which served as a basis for the ICC later on.” 
It was noted that the historical period during which the ICTY and ICTR were 
created was special. “They were the product of a certain historical moment—the 
end of the Cold War and the beginning of Perestroika—when there existed a 
certain good faith and willingness.” A number of participants agreed that if 
political conditions then were such as they are now, the tribunals would never 
have been created. 
As to the winding down of the non-permanent courts, some judges expressed 
dissatisfaction with the way in which residual mechanisms have been designed. 
Their shape has been driven by budgetary concerns, a judge remarked; “it is 
leaner with judges on a roster—there are no expenses when they are not sitting 
on a case, no pensions, many fewer staff.” But another judge suggested that there 
are negative trade-offs to such cost cutting. “The residual mechanism is a 
complete denial of what should be the ideal scenario for a group of international 
judges working together. They will work from home, maybe get together in court 
for a few days. I honestly believe that whoever is responsible for this strategy 
will have second thoughts and not follow the pattern in the future.” Indeed, added 
another criminal judge, the residual mechanism has serious implications for fair 
trial principles. 
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As to the question of legacy, participants were urged to think of it as an 
ongoing process. “International judges today are shaped by the legacy of what 
transpired in the past. And even though we talk about the ad hocs and the SCSL 
ending, the jurisprudence that they generated will be used in national courts for 
years and years to come.” 
What Kinds of Changes Will Be Seen in The International Judicial Landscape? 
Participants had diverse notions of how both specific institutions and 
international judicial trends might evolve over the coming years. Some predicted 
that ad hoc institutions were a thing of the past; international organizations and 
States would content themselves with a single permanent criminal court, the ICC, 
and the other permanent institutions that address human rights violations and 
interstate disputes. One judge qualified this statement, observing that ad hoc 
arbitration bodies were becoming increasingly popular for some kinds of dispute 
resolution, and predicted that this would continue in the future. 
It was predicted that the next four or five years would be determinative for the 
ECtHR. The Court has been relieved of much external pressure following its 
improved productivity and reduced backlog of cases. However, its continued 
success depends largely on factors outside of the Court, namely that States Parties 
take effective measures to prevent violations of the European Convention and that 
the Council of Europe assists in the national implementation of the Convention, as 
outlined in the 2012 Brighton Declaration.63 The possibility that the WTO 
Appellate Body might act as a center of dispute settlement in the future for trade 
agreements across the globe was mentioned. And the prospect of the IACtHR 
becoming a truly regional court—with Canadian, US and pan-Caribbean 
membership—was described in hopeful terms. However, if any States repeal their 
maintenance of that court, or if other serious challenges arise, it will not bode well 
for the IACtHR, especially as its parent Organization of American States finds 
itself at a historically weak point. 
Several judges mentioned the important ongoing role that civil society plays 
in shaping the work of international courts and tribunals. When institutions are 
subject to political manipulation or public criticism by unsupportive States, 
NGOs often come to the rescue. As one participant phrased it, “there is 
sometimes saber rattling, but civil society will ensure that membership in our 
Court continues.” 
Enhanced cooperation among international, regional and national judiciaries 
was indicated as critical for the future of the international justice system overall. 
“It is important to strengthen the intermediate judicial institutions with the view 
of improving justice delivery at national levels,” noted a judge. Another 
suggested that the UN persuade Member States to incorporate provisions into 
 
63. See Brighton Declaration, Eur. Ct. H.R., http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2012_Brighton_ 
FinalDeclaration_ENG.pdf. 
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their constitutions so that any ruling of the ICJ or another international court 
would have the same status, and be enforced in the same manner, as a judgment 
of the States’ highest courts. 
This point led to a discussion of the potential of advisory opinions by 
international courts and tribunals to disseminate international law at the domestic 
level. An interstate dispute judge noted that, in contrast to contentious jurisdiction, 
advisory jurisdiction “does not infringe on sovereignty but is instead a useful tool 
for States to sort out their differences.” A human rights judge concurred, 
observing that if his court is one day allowed to make advisory opinions, it would 
give rise to productive interaction with States Parties. Another human rights judge 
expressed the hope that advisory opinions from her court would “strengthen 
democratic institutions and concepts and promote development.” Although States 
in her region do not seem interested in such opinions at the moment, “better 
educated people are replacing the ‘fossils’; there is going to be more dynamism 
and willingness for change, without fear of change.” 
The need for change in the area of international judicial elections was then 
raised. As one judge phrased it, “the election process needs radical 
reorganization!” Another participant felt it was critically important that age limits 
be placed on candidates for judicial positions; given the length of many 
international judicial terms, he argued, only individuals with the capacity to be 
productive for years to come should enter into the nomination process. A 
criminal judge expressed concern about the qualifications of judges. “We are a 
serious criminal institution and should be staffed and run by experts. What we 
should have is a properly constituted selection committee made up of 
experienced practitioners who know what is needed. Judicial elections are 
divisive in the US, and they are divisive in the international community.” A 
judge from a small country raised a different issue with the current election 
system. “It should not only be States with more leverage and diplomatic power 
that get their candidates on the bench. This is not how justice should be done.” 
Discussion about the future shape of the international justice system ended 
with the reiteration of an idea expressed earlier in the institute: that the next 
generation of legal experts is certain to be more open and attuned to the needs of 
the system. “We are living, as suggested, in a human rights era,” said a 
participant. “We can see at the university level worldwide that students have an 
interest in international law. They realize that international cooperation is 
important, and they bring a keen interest in human rights law in particular.” 
The Future of the ICC 
Many participants offered their thoughts on the future of the ICC, given its 
important place as the only current permanent international criminal body, now 
and probably for some time to come. One criminal judge suggested that if the 
ICC is to ensure its global relevance, it should establish regional seats in Africa, 
the Americas, and the Asia Pacific region. Another criminal judge quickly 
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rejoined, “But who is going to pay for it? Establishing permanent ICC seats 
around the world, especially where there are no ongoing situations, would be 
hugely expensive. And the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) is already balking at 
the budget in one location.” This prompted a comment by a third criminal judge, 
who felt that the Court is being micro-managed by the ASP. However, it was 
acknowledged that the ASP had recently come forward to ask judges for their 
ideas on how the Court’s legal framework might be amended so as to accelerate 
proceedings. 
Several participants suggested that the ICC should be more proactive in 
controlling its costs. One judge suggested that some of its practices are 
unnecessary. “I have a lot of sympathy for victim participation in proceedings, 
but it does slow down proceedings and it is expensive.” The ICC pre-trial 
procedures were also cited as questionable; the Court uses hearings, complete 
with defense counsel, to confirm charges instead of using written submissions as 
was practiced at the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL. “There should be no trial before the 
trial,” observed a judge. He went on to wonder, “Will the sponsors agree to 
continue funding the ICC at this very high level?” A judge with a military 
background tried to put such concerns into perspective, noting that building and 
deploying one F-35 stealth fighter costs twice as much as operating the ICC for 
one year. “Which benefits humankind more?” he asked. 
A novel strategy for establishing stable and adequate funding for the ICC was 
then put forward. Inspired by the earlier description of how the CCJ is financed 
through a trust fund, a far-thinking judge suggested that the ASP call on 
corporations, whose profit margins can be impacted by international crimes, to 
contribute to the ICC’s budget. States are not the only entities that can support the 
Court, she urged; in some cases, private companies have more resources. And 
corporations have interests in ICC situations and cases, just as individual victims 
do. 
In relation to political support for the ICC, one judge expressed his hope that, 
within 20 years, the ICC would have universal membership. A participant with 
long experience at the UN opined that there is a particular need for powerful 
States, especially the US, to ratify the Rome Statute and more generally live up to 
contemporary international legal norms. He reminded the group that the US 
government is still operating a detention center at Guantánamo, in flagrant 
violation of international standards. “If the US were subject to the jurisdiction of 
an international human rights court,” he declared, “the White House could be 
wallpapered with judgments against it.” However, he added, “unless every major 
player is on board, it will be difficult to have the world join hands in support of 
the ICC.” 
Another participant disagreed with this point of view, however. “Given 
political attempts to influence the ICC, maybe it is better for the institution to 
mature before the US takes a hand in it.” She added that just because the US 
government is not currently a State Party, it does not mean that all Americans 
reject the court, and she urged Americans to voice their support. “The ICC is a 
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miracle court. It would have been beyond the comprehension of anyone 20 years 
ago to believe it would exist. We need to build it up and ensure that no institutions 
compete with it.” 
New Kinds of Courts 
The session ended with a discussion of the new kinds of international courts 
that might become necessary in the years to come. These included institutions 
with jurisdictions over piracy, international economic crimes, cybercrimes, 
environmental disputes, human and drug trafficking and terrorism. 
It was noted that during the early negotiations of the Rome Statute, both drug 
trafficking and terrorism were suggested for inclusion in the ICC’s jurisdiction; 
these crimes were eventually dropped, however. The gravity of drug trafficking 
and organized crime in Mexico was then described: more than 70,000 people 
have been killed as a consequence of organized crime, with the result that the 
Mexican State has received multiple complaints that it is unable to fulfill its 
human rights obligation to protect the life and personal security of its citizens. 
The IACtHR ultimately agreed with this assertion, ruling against Mexico in 2009 
in a case involving the murder of women in Ciudad Juárez and Mexico’s failure 
to investigate and solve the crimes.64 
One judge wondered if a new chamber of the ICC could be constituted to 
address economic crimes and cybercrimes. Another suggested that the ICJ take 
on more cases involving environmental disputes between States. This would be 
helpful, added a judge; otherwise, the WTO will have to resolve all cases related 
to the economic aspects of environmental disputes. Several participants believed 
that creating a court to address terrorism specifically should be a priority. One 
judge noted that terrorism is endemic and will only increase as globalization 
increases. “We need a specialized international terrorism court, different from the 
ICC, so we can keep up with and ahead of international terrorists.” It was also 
noted that cross-border cases—such as those involving terrorism and 
environmental degradation—cannot be easily adjudicated by domestic courts. 
“Globalization will lead to more trans-border issues that call for an international 
or regional response.” 
In closing, session leaders reminded participants that international courts 
should develop side by side with domestic judiciaries. “Whether we create new 
courts or use existing ones, we need to increase and enhance cooperation with 
domestic courts.” The idea of prevention was also raised. While it is critical that 
international courts and tribunals be as efficient, cost-effective, and responsive as 
possible to societies’ evolving needs, the best strategy for creating a more just 
world is for crimes, disputes, and human rights violations to be avoided in the 
first place. Increased communication across the international/regional/domestic 
 
64. See Caso González y Otras v. Mexico, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205, (Nov. 16, 2009). 
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divide, and among the judiciaries operating at those different levels, can also 
serve to strengthen prevention strategies. 
“Human Rights World” 
Over five plenary sessions, BIIJ participants discussed a diverse set of issues 
related to the increasing centrality of human rights to the rule of law, and the 
ways in which this centrality manifests itself in both domestic and international 
legal orders. It was suggested that the title of BIIJ 2013—“the International Rule 
of Law in a Human Rights Era”—might not capture the essence of the 
phenomenon under discussion. The use of the word “era” implies a temporary 
state of being, one that will be succeeded by another. Participants seemed to 
agree, however, that awareness of and respect for human rights have become an 
enduring part of who we are as global citizens of the 21st century. Rather than a 
“human rights era,” we live in a “human rights world.” 
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BREAKOUT GROUP DISCUSSIONS 
While most sessions at the 2013 Brandeis Institute for International Judges 
followed a plenary format, judges serving on the benches of human rights, 
interstate dispute resolution and criminal courts also had the opportunity to 
discuss issues of particular interest to their respective types of jurisdiction. 
Participants conferred with one another before the institute began to determine a 
list of topics to discuss during these breakout sessions. The following are the 
highlights of their discussions. 
Human Rights Courts 
Judges serving on human rights courts in Africa, the Americas and Europe 
took as their primary topic of conversation the approach adopted by their 
respective institutions toward indigenous peoples and other distinctive groups. 
Given the diverse national backgrounds of those participating in the session, as 
well as their experiences with different regional human rights systems, the 
discussion was wide-ranging and instructive. 
Of the three regional human rights systems currently in operation, only the 
African one moves beyond individual rights to make special reference to the 
rights of “peoples,” that is, distinctive communities and ethnic groups living 
within sovereign States.65 The situation of the Ogiek people in Kenya was raised 
as an example. The Ogiek are an ethnic and linguistic group that has historically 
lived in and been sustained by the Mau Forest. When the Kenyan government 
opened up the forest for development and sought to relocate the Ogiek, a case 
was brought by several NGOs to the African Commission on Human and 
People’s Rights, which then referred the case to the ACtHPR. In March 2013, the 
Court ruled that development posed the risk of irreparable harm to the Ogiek 
Community and violated their rights as guaranteed under the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights. It ordered the Kenyan government to reinstate 
restrictions it had imposed on land transactions in the Mau Forest while the Court 
reached a decision on the issue.66 It was noted that similar situations have arisen 
with indigenous groups in Malawi, Namibia, Tanzania and Uganda, especially 
when the rights of traditional communities conflict with government plans for 
touristic and other kinds of development, which can clearly bring benefits to 
other sectors of the national population. “It is a balancing act,” declared a judge, 
noting that the Court must look carefully at the array of rights guaranteed in the 
African Charter in order to arrive at a fair decision. 
 
65. For more about the status of indigenous rights, see BIIJ 2012 Report, Making a Place for Indigenous 
Rights in Global Justice, at 32, BRANDEIS U.,  
http://www.brandeis.edu/ethics/pdfs/internationaljustice/biij/Making_place_2012.pdf. 
66. See African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Kenya, App. No. 006/2012, Afr. Ct. Hum. 
& Peoples’ Rts., Order of Provisional Measures (Mar. 15, 2013), available at http://www.african-court.org/ 
en/images/documents/Orders-Files/ORDER__of_Provisional_Measures_African_Union_v_Kenya.pdf. 
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The discussion then turned to the situation of indigenous rights in Latin 
America.  Indigenous groups in that region have also struggled with governments 
as well as multinational corporations seeking to exploit their traditional territories 
for natural resources, such as rivers that can provide hydroelectric power. Unlike 
the African Charter, the American Convention on Human Rights does not 
recognize the rights of indigenous peoples. However, the IACtHR has 
acknowledged the concept of “collective ownership” through rulings related to 
Ecuador, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Suriname. A judge explained, “In the 
jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court over the last ten years, there have been 
some dramatic interpretations of human rights in a context that was not even 
mentioned when the Convention was approved of—that indigenous peoples see 
ownership of land as collective, as part of their patrimony and also their identity.” 
It was noted by participants that the special connection of indigenous peoples to 
ancestral lands—a connection that defies contemporary notions of land as a 
simple commodity—is also found in parts of Africa and Asia. 
The complexity of deciding which groups can be designated as “indigenous” 
was also referenced. It was noted that most ethnic groups in Africa are able to 
trace their origins to the continent. The term “indigenous” generally refers 
instead to groups that distinguish themselves from mainstream populations by 
their mode of production—for example hunting and gathering—and historic 
attachment to a particular territory. This definition contrasts with that used in 
Latin America, where indigenous groups are generally those whose ancestors 
were already occupying the territory upon the arrival of Europeans. There are 
exceptions to this definition, however, as in the case of Afro-Colombians or other 
populations descended from Africans brought by Europeans as slave labor. If 
other populations follow a distinctive lifestyle and have a demonstrable history in 
a particular location, they may also be designated as indigenous. 
In contrast to Africa and Latin America, Europe has few populations that can 
be considered truly indigenous. One exception is the Sami people who inhabit the 
Nordic countries of Europe and have traditionally herded reindeer. One judge 
spoke of the pressures to assimilate that the Sami have experienced over the 
years, and also of encroachment on their traditional lands. In Norway, he related, 
tensions between the mainstream and Sami populations have mostly been 
resolved not through proceedings before the courts but rather through legislative 
and political means. The issue of Sami rights to ancestral grazing lands that are 
now under private ownership came before the ECtHR several years ago, in 
Handölsdalen Sami Village and Others v. Sweden.67 The Court declared 
inadmissible inter alia the complaint by the Sami villages that a violation had 
occurred of their property rights under Article 1 of Additional Protocol Number 
11 of the European Convention.68 However, the Court ultimately awarded 
 
67. See Handölsdalen Sami Village et. al. v. Sweden, App. No. 39013/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., Judgment (Mar. 
30, 2010), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-97993. 
68. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as 
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damages to the Sami applicants for the costs involved in the excessively long 
national proceedings preceding the ECtHR case. 
Another group mentioned in the European context were the Roma. Although 
this group may not qualify as an indigenous people per se, the distinctive identity 
of the Roma people has often led to discriminatory actions toward them in the 
various States where they reside. As noted in D.H. and Others v. Czech Republic, 
“[A]s a result of their turbulent history and constant uprooting the Roma have 
become a specific type of disadvantaged and vulnerable minority . . . As the 
Court has noted in previous cases, they therefore require special protection.”69 
ECtHR cases involving discrimination against the Roma have included issues of 
access to education, permission to occupy public space, harassment and violence 
by authorities, and forced sterilization.70 
Human rights judges also discussed the limits of legal pluralism in their 
respective regions. To what extent should indigenous or customary law be 
allowed to exert its authority? What happens when this law is in conflict with 
national and/or international norms? These are questions that arise not 
infrequently in Africa and the Americas when indigenous groups seek to exert 
their autonomy. The question of pluralism also arises in relation to immigrant 
groups that continue to follow the dictates of another legal system, such as Sharia 
Law, or have practices that do not conform to those of their adopted country. The 
discussions in Europe around the practice of female genital mutilation and, more 
recently, male circumcision, were raised, as well as the contentious debate in 
some European countries that continues to rage around the wearing of 
headscarves, veils, and burqas by Muslim women. 
Interstate Dispute Resolution Courts 
Judges serving on the benches of dispute resolution bodies used their 
breakout session to discuss how the work of their institutions can be viewed 
through a human rights lens. They participated in a lively debate, bringing into 
the conversation the unique experiences of their respective institutions. The 
resulting discussion addressed a wide range of issues related to human rights, 
from copyright protection and digital censorship to piracy and compliance 
challenges, all under the umbrella of interstate claims and disputes. 
The session began with a discussion of interstate disputes at the WTO. Two 
of the most notable issues discussed were what is sometimes dubbed the “iTunes 
case,”
71
 and another set of cases regarding international restrictions on the sale of 
 
amended by Protocol No. 11, art. 1, E.T.S. 155, (entered into force Nov. 1, 1998), available at 
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69. Fact Sheet, Eur. Ct. H.R., Roma and Travellers, (Oct. 2013), available at  http://www.echr.coe.int/ 
Documents/FS_Roma_ENG.pdf. 
70. Id. 
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clove-flavored cigarettes.72 The underlying human rights implications of those 
trade-related cases, especially the iTunes one, managed to surprise some of the 
participants. In that case, China—a WTO member brought into the organization 
under strict conditions—requested that government firms be the sole distributors 
of digital content, arguing this is the only way to “control public morals,” for 
example through limiting access to child pornography. The balance between two 
human rights-related issues was extensively discussed: on the one hand, the open 
trade to which the WTO is committed, and which includes the promotion of 
freedom of expression, and on the other hand, the protection of children from 
exploitation by the pornography industry. 
The group then turned to the relationship that arises between States and 
international tribunals with regard to international conventions, particularly the 
issue of their enforcement. This was an issue about which all participants had 
concerns, despite representing very different kinds of courts. The questions 
addressed included: How can (and how do) courts deal with dualism in the legal 
sense, where States sign treaties that they are not ready to or cannot enforce due 
to, for example, constitutional constraints? How should courts deal with weak 
State machinery that has trouble enforcing international conventions? And what 
should international courts do in cases of non-compliance with their judgments? 
The CCJ recently addressed some of these questions in the case of Shanique 
Myrie v. the State of Barbados (2013).73 It discussed the proposition that where 
domestic law was not consistent with international obligations to which the State 
had committed by treaty, as part of the Caribbean Community, the Court could 
enforce the treaty obligation of the State even when it was not incorporated into 
domestic law. The case also addressed how States could observe their 
international obligations domestically, in the absence of action by parliament, 
through powers exercised by the executive and the judiciary to the extent 
permitted by national constitutions. The regional press, a judge reported, was 
heartened by the discussion of these issues and their impact on State 
responsibility. 
The session continued with a discussion about human rights-related issues in 
the enforcement of the Convention on the Law of the Sea. After a brief 
explanation of Article 73 of the Convention,74 which details the enforcement of 
laws and regulations of the coastal State, and Article 292,75 which addresses the 
prompt release of vessels and crews, various situations were discussed in which 
the failure of States Parties to respect the Convention constituted a breach of 
 
72. Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove 
Cigarettes, WT/DS 406/AB/R (Apr. 4, 2012). 
73. Shanique Myrie v. the State of Barbados (State of Jamaica intervening), CCJ 3 OJ, Judgment 
(October 4, 2013), available at http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/2013-CCJ-
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74. Id., art. 73, 10 Dec. 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. 
75. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 292. 
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human rights. A notable example was the “MV Louisa” case,76 in which a vessel 
was confiscated and the crew detained. Furthermore, it was related that the 
daughter of a crewmember, who was not connected to the original incident, 
came to visit her father and was also subsequently detained. ITLOS ultimately 
found that it had no jurisdiction in this case, regrettably, since this was an 
obvious case of human rights violations. 
This portion of the discussion also touched upon the issue of piracy, and the 
measures taken against pirates. Several important questions came out of the 
discussion about human rights and the law of the sea, including how ITLOS, if it 
were to have jurisdiction, should react to breaches of human rights, and whether 
it should offer compensation to victims of such breaches. 
The breakout session ended with participants revisiting the issue of State 
Party compliance, now through the experience of the ICJ. It was explained that 
the Court’s mandate to resolve interstate disputes does not leave much formal 
space for the consideration of human rights issues. That being said, and as noted 
in the opening session of the institute, the ICJ has increasingly found ways to 
apply a human rights lens to its judicial interpretation. Also, like other 
international courts, the ICJ is frustrated when parties do not comply with its 
judgments. It was suggested by a participant that the UN has perhaps more 
mechanisms to deal with this phenomenon than courts or States. He continued, 
“If sovereign States truly accept the rule of law, the need for enforcement will 
become moot.” 
Criminal Courts 
Judges from six international courts and tribunals came together in this 
breakout group to share their experiences and discuss, among other issues, how 
ongoing crimes in Syria might be addressed judicially. To frame the discussion, 
the judges decided to invent a hypothetical situation in which a small nation—
“Ruritania”—is experiencing a violent civil conflict. As Ruritania is not a State 
Party to the Rome Statute, it asks the United Nations to set up a judicial 
mechanism to address crimes against humanity and war crimes allegedly 
committed on its territory. The principal question discussed by judges in the 
session was, “What form should the Ruritanian international criminal tribunal 
take?” 
Given the presence of criminal judges from geographically disparate courts 
at BIIJ 2013, it was apt that the first issue addressed by judges was whether the 
Ruritanian court should be of a regional or international character. In other 
words, should it be located in the same region as Ruritania, and be staffed by 
prosecutors, judges and administrators who know the region, its laws, and its 
practices? Or would an international court, staffed by individuals who come from 
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all over the world and are knowledgeable about international norms, produce a 
better result? 
While participants agreed that a regional solution carried with it the 
advantage of local legitimacy, their overall consensus was that that an 
international tribunal was better suited to address international crimes. One judge 
pointed out that while international tribunals might have a harder time with 
outreach, a regional court would not have the power of the United Nations to 
back its decisions and compel the cooperation of Member States. 
Next the group sought to outline the best ways for the “International 
Criminal Tribunal for Ruritania” to carry out its function. One judge eloquently 
described the broad outlines of its mandate: “In principle, the tribunal should aim 
at getting the people most responsible for the most horrendous crimes that 
occur.” However, participants had different views on how much flexibility 
should be given to the prosecutor. Some judges emphasized the need for a strong, 
autonomous prosecution, but others felt that when it came to case selection, some 
structure or filtering system would be necessary to put a check on the 
prosecution’s power. 
The judges also recommended that some parallel system be set up to deal 
with those criminals not deemed “most responsible.” Some participants were 
strongly in favor of a truth and reconciliation commission, while others suggested 
that if Ruritania had retained the rule of law, the best option would be to work 
through its domestic courts. 
As to the exact location of the fictional international criminal tribunal, 
participants felt that many factors should be taken into account, including 
practicality, security, ease of evidence collection, objectivity of staff and 
promotion of its legitimacy. One judge strongly advocated that the tribunal be 
situated in a country neighboring Ruritania or alternatively in The Netherlands. 
The idea that it would be untenable to establish a court in situ met with some 
pushback, however; some judges felt that security would not be an 
insurmountable obstacle and should not stand in the way of the regional 
legitimacy that would come from having a court located where the crimes in 
question took place. Judges also discussed the appropriate time to set up a 
tribunal in relation to the conflict that produced the crimes under consideration. 
All agreed that no matter where a court was set up, extra security precautions 
needed to be taken if the conflict was still ongoing. 
The longest and most complicated topic discussed regarded the 
administrative structure of the proposed international tribunal. This encompassed 
the language(s) to be used, hiring of personnel, resource allocation, security, 
witness compensation, and Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE). The judges 
were split over whether an international tribunal should follow the diverse, 
multilingual approach of the ICTY and ICTR, which had staff and judges from 
diverse nations with different languages and legal traditions. The alternative 
would be for the Ruritanian tribunal to forego the election of judges from varying 
legal cultures in order to minimize the expenses of translation and interpretation. 
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However, this would entail another loss, that of the varied legal expertise and 
knowledge of relevant jurisprudence from a broad range of sources that 
international judges could provide. Some judges felt that the approach of the 
tribunal, especially its RPE, should be influenced as heavily as possible by local 
legal tradition. Others felt that the RPE should be adopted not from local judicial 
institutions, but former international courts and tribunals. 
While many of the topics were hotly debated, there was one over which the 
judges had unanimous agreement. They saw only two viable options for funding 
this new international criminal tribunal: either it would have to seek UN funding 
through Chapter VII of the UN Charter, or it must have a self-sustaining system, 
such as a trust fund, to be fully funded before the launch of the tribunal, and upon 
whose income the tribunal could depend and reasonably function. Depending on 
circumstances, either option could work, but under no circumstances, participants 
agreed, would it be appropriate for support to be provided on a voluntary basis by 
donor States or other entities. 
This discussion about a fictional situation and criminal tribunal was a neutral 
way to talk about the lessons learned from the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL. While it 
is unknown whether any future ad hoc criminal tribunals will ever be created, the 
advantages and challenges associated with different ways of regulating, financing 
and staffing such institutions will continue to be analyzed by members of the 
international legal community for some time to come. 
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IN THE SPOTLIGHT  
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE: IN WHOSE NAME? 
The Brandeis Institute for International Judges traditionally includes a 
session that allows participants to take their conversation to a higher plane of 
reflection while still remaining anchored in the realities of their judicial work. At 
the 2013 session, the group explored the basis of the legitimacy of their 
institutions. It is clear that international courts no longer function solely as a 
dispute resolution mechanism between consenting States; they have acquired 
more autonomy and scope over the last few decades. What, then, are 
international courts really for? On whose behalf do they speak? And how do such 
questions affect the day-to-day work of judges? 
The first part of the discussion used a recent article by Armin von Bogdandy 
and Ingo Venzke77 as a point of departure. The authors suggest that the 
disconnection of international courts and tribunals from the usual systems of 
regulation, oversight and accountability found in the national context is a source 
of concern and skepticism. Domestic courts speak the law in the name of the 
people while invoking the democratic sovereign. But in whose name exactly, the 
authors ask, do international courts and tribunals render decisions? Many 
questions have consequently been raised about the source of the authority of 
these courts and tribunals and their relation to notions of democracy. 
One way to counter the “democratic deficit” of international adjudication, the 
authors argue, is to work more explicitly towards the creation of a global legal 
system. A more coherent system might offer a kind of stability and protection of 
basic principles that would approximate the virtues of democracy in an 
international context.78 They also contend that “the starting point of democratic 
justifications [of the work of international courts] are the individuals whose 
freedom shapes the judgments.”79 
Participants eagerly debated these points and others raised in the article. One 
judge observed, “It is a fact that a democratic process is not generally followed 
by States in establishing courts. It has been done in a way that the interests of 
States are prominent in the selection of judges and in control over the courts.” 
Another participant agreed with the authors that a global legal system should be a 
common goal: “It is a necessity for States to have increasingly harmonious 
legislation, applying within States and across borders.” Still another questioned 
the basic relationship between democratic forces and legal systems. “In my own 
country, the legal order is enshrined in a constitution that was based on the will 
of the people 100 years ago. If a law was enacted in the name of ‘the people,’ 
 
77. Armin von Bogdandy &Ingo Venzke, In Whose Name: An Investigation of International Courts’ 
Public Authority and Its Democratic Justification, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L.7 (2012). 
78. Id. at 15. 
79. Id. at 41. 
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who are they? It is largely a fiction to refer to such an entity.” 
Some participants contended that there are essential differences between how 
national and international legal systems are legitimated.  A participant with both 
domestic and international judicial experience characterized the international 
justice system as having a certain “limitlessness of judicial function.” Another 
qualified this viewpoint, adding that “international judges have a broader 
responsibility for creating their own kinds of limits than domestic judges, whose 
functions may already be circumscribed.” 
The question then arose, if international courts and tribunals do not have their 
legitimacy established through democratic processes, how is their authority 
established? BIIJ participants brought the experience of their respective 
institutions to bear upon the discussion. 
One judge began his remarks by distinguishing between legality and 
legitimacy. He assumed that all international courts and tribunals operate within 
their given legal frameworks and cannot alter them. But institutions can make 
conscious changes in their activities in order to increase their legitimacy. As an 
example, the efforts of the IACtHR were described: 1) The Court holds public 
hearings, often transmitted live through television and the internet; 2) it also 
holds hearings around the Latin American region, instead of always at its seat in 
Costa Rica, so that thousands of people have direct contact with its proceedings; 
3) the IACtHR has forged close connections with the media, not only for 
publicity but also so that the judgments of the Court can be explained to the 
public; and finally, 4) the Court engages in jurisprudential dialogue with other 
regional and international courts, and also with domestic courts when possible. 
The result of these efforts, clearly shown through polls, is that people in the 
region know about the IACtHR and support its work. 
One judge noted the absence of a central authority that ensures compliance 
with the judgments of most international courts and tribunals. This is markedly 
different from the domestic context, where flouting a judgment could entail 
serious consequences. Why, then, do parties comply with the judgments of an 
institution like the ICJ? Several reasons were suggested, including the credibility 
and moral authority of the Court, the inherent fairness of its judgments, and 
apprehension of isolation from the international community for non-compliance. 
“In the eyes of the world, countries feel obliged to comply,” explained a judge. 
The experience of the WTO AB was then described. “Its story is different,” 
claimed a participant. It has earned legitimacy through deciding a very large 
number of cases since its establishment 20 years ago—119 at the time of BIIJ 
2013. It has also consistently rendered decisions within its 90-day time limit. 
“We should think of legitimacy as being earned through judgments rather than 
through the design of a court,” continued the participant. It was also noted that 
the WTO AB has a 90% compliance rate with its judgments. Furthermore, failure 
to follow the provisions of WTO AB judgments carries consequences, as 
countermeasures may be put in place against the non-complying party. 
The conversation then turned to international criminal courts and tribunals 
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and in whose name they perform their work. The view of the ECCC was very 
clear: “We regard as our primary audience the ordinary people of Cambodia, and 
only second the international community, jurists and academics.” This priority 
can be clearly seen in the way the Court’s judgments are written—in a 
linguistically accessible manner for easy translation, with the “jurisprudential 
rigor” confined to the footnotes. The ECCC also makes a conscious effort to 
harmonize its jurisprudence with that of other criminal courts so as to avoid the 
fragmentation of norms, thereby contributing to the global legal system 
suggested by von Bogdandy and Venzke in their aforementioned article.80 
The ICC is also very clear about the primary constituency of its work—the 
victims of the crimes under the Court’s jurisdiction. “Those who are familiar 
with how victim participation works at the ICC will know that the international 
community went full steam ahead,” said a participant, referring to its provisions 
for legal representation of those designated as victims of the persons standing 
trial. This same participant wondered whether victims have not been given too 
much leeway, and whether “judges might have overly interpreted the legal 
framework regarding victims.” There is also a concern that States, in 
implementing legislation to domesticate the various provisions of the Rome 
Statute, might not be able to “deliver” to victims what the ICC does. 
Not all criminal judges agreed, however, that their institutions render 
judgments solely in the name of victims. “Courts should not be accountable just to 
individuals,” declared one, “but to humanity as a whole.” Another judge added 
that, ultimately, international courts are created to serve the international 
community. “And if that community comes to the conclusion that the institution 
does not serve its purpose, then, in the long term, that would be the end of it.” 
The first part of the session ended with a philosophical reflection by a 
participant with broad international judicial experience that had included service 
on the bench of an international criminal tribunal. He noted the importance of the 
conscience of judges, day in and day out. “When you are sitting on a trial with 
four accused, where the decisions are breathtakingly complicated, or when a 
young legal officer comes in late at night and asks, ‘Judge, what are we doing?’, 
you struggle with that. Who am I, an individual, to decide whether someone 
should be found guilty or not guilty, based on the testimony of hundreds of 
witnesses about events that took place years earlier?” But he concluded that this 
is part of the job that international judges have been given: “We have been 
entrusted to apply the law in an independent and impartial way, with fairness and 
independence.” Another participant offered his own interpretation of their 
mandate: “Judges are only responsible to their own sense of rectitude, of what is 
right and wrong. We have to recognize that.” 
The group then turned from general questions of authority and legitimacy in 
the sphere of international justice to a challenge faced by international criminal 
 
80. Id. 
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courts and tribunals in particular—the question of whether they are effective in 
bringing about a justice that is meaningful for the victims in whose name—at 
least in part—they speak. 
The discussion was inspired by the 2013 Distinguished Lecture in 
International Justice and Human Rights delivered at Brandeis University by 
Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein of Jordan.81 He delved deeply into the question 
of how men and women seek to restore their humanity in the wake of genocide 
and other atrocities. While a strong supporter of international criminal justice and 
an important actor in the establishment and early years of the ICC, Prince Zeid 
nonetheless questioned whether contemporary international criminal justice is 
satisfactory for those who have suffered, especially given its frequent failure to 
produce expressions of true remorse by those convicted of grave crimes. In the 
words of Prince Zeid, “Should we not aspire to something more, something 
deeper, than merely punishing the guilty?”82 
A criminal judge responded to this question by noting that the kind of 
individuals who commit the crimes addressed by international criminal tribunals 
cannot be expected to show remorse. “No normal person behaves like that. They 
have no empathy; so many are sociopaths or have a narcissistic personality 
disorder.” But another participant pointed out that one of Prince Zeid’s assertions 
is exactly the opposite—that normal people, given a particular combination of 
circumstances, can become capable of heinous acts (see sidebar, page 51). 
  
 
81. Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein, Hashemite Kingdom’s Permanent Rep. to the U.N., Beyond 
Nuremburg: the Future of International Criminal Justice. Distinguished Lecture in International Justice and 
Human Rights, Distinguished Lecture in International Justice and Human Rights at Brandies University (30 
January 2013), available at http://www.brandeis.edu/ethics/pdfs/publications/Prince_Zeid_Beyond_Nuremberg 
_Jan_2013.pdf. 
82. Id. at 3. 
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From “Beyond Nuremberg: the Future of International Criminal Justice” 
“[M]ost war criminals are not born with a desire to murder; rather, they 
are normal people who kill because in the strange cocktails of 
circumstances that can arise, and impelled by specific aspects of human 
evolutionary psychology, they feel they have no choice but to obey, 
thoughtlessly and even reluctantly (invoking the orders of superiors), and 
out of fear of punishment should they not obey—and if there is any guilt 
to be borne, they believe it is not their burden to bear. Others, on the 
other hand, will murder willingly, because the release from moral 
responsibility fans an inner desire to exercise power without restriction. 
The evil they all perpetrate is rationalized—or, in the words of one 
Holocaust historian, “internally justified”—to such an extreme that they 
do not recognize themselves as evil.”* 
* Supra note 81 at 7. 
 
Another criminal judge disagreed that the expression of remorse was so very 
rare. He related the statement of a war criminal convicted by an international 
tribunal who had recently been granted an early release from prison. “He said 
that the greatest relief he experienced was when he was given the opportunity not 
only to plead guilty but also to express remorse for what he was responsible for. 
He had been nobody, and when given power he transformed himself into a beast. 
For that he showed regret.” 
A third criminal judge brought a slightly different interpretation to the 
expression of remorse. She agreed that war criminals are a particular kind of 
person, but not because they are necessarily abnormal—they are instead 
dangerous, as they may continue to command a loyal following. She noted that 
among the conditions for early release of those persons convicted by her court is 
the requirement that they “make amends through public declarations and reach 
out to victims.” This is not just for humanitarian reasons, she explained. If 
convicted criminals have issued a public statement of their wrongdoing, even if it 
is only symbolic, it is on record and their followers will hear of it. 
Several participants agreed with Prince Zeid that an apology or expression of 
remorse by perpetrators does something unique for victims. A judge said that he 
was proud of his own government for having made a public apology to members 
of his country’s indigenous population for human rights violations they had 
suffered over the years. The restorative impact on victims of telling their stories 
in front of truth and reconciliation commissions was also described. A judge who 
had served for more than a decade on a criminal tribunal offered his viewpoint: 
“My experience is that many witnesses are not seeking a pound of flesh, nor a 
particular number of years as a sentence. They are happy to be given the 
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opportunity to be heard.” 
But the idea that international criminal proceedings consider victims their 
primary constituency was not shared by all participants. “Coming from the UN 
system,” said a judge, “I tend to disagree that international courts and tribunals are 
created out of concern for the victims. Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter 
provide that the Security Council can take measures to preserve and create peace 
and stability.” Another judge concurred: “I don’t think that the ICTY and ICTR 
were created in the name or interest of victims. I think the two tribunals were the 
result of the shock that permeated the international community when, less than 50 
years after the Second World War, such atrocities were being committed, one in 
Europe and one in Africa.” 
A number of participants went on to articulate their views that the interests of 
international justice extend beyond individual victims to the larger societies in 
which crimes or violations have taken place. “Especially when you have 
international violations of human rights, or crimes of a magnitude that is 
regarded by the international community as a gross violation, these crimes offend 
everybody, not only victims. So healing the society has to be expressed through 
the role of the court.” One judge went so far as to say that there are three interests 
to be taken into account: “victims, societies, and the future.” Another participant 
returned to the importance of remorse, noting, “Not only expressing remorse but 
also telling those stories in other ways can help people in the future understand 
how vulnerable their societies may be to the recurrence of such crimes.” 
Using a multi-pronged approach to justice applies not only to criminal 
tribunals but also to human rights courts where systemic problems are often 
identified and addressed through individual cases. One participant noted that 
the IACtHR includes in its judgments many measures characteristic of 
transitional justice mechanisms, in order “to compensate the affected persons 
and also heal that society.” For example, public apology ceremonies may be 
ordered, as well as truth-seeking activities such as criminal investigations or 
truth commissions, and changes in public policy or law so that future violations 
of a similar nature may be avoided. The ACtHPR, though a much younger 
court, is seeking to have the same kinds of impacts through its judgments, and 
also through outreach activities, including outreach to domestic courts. It is 
critical to help the average person access institutions of justice by making the 
application process simple and providing legal counsel where necessary. Said 
one participant, “We need to make sure that people not only reach the door of 
the palace of justice but can also pass through.” 
As to the long-term effectiveness of international criminal justice, there were 
some expressions of frustration among participants.  Said a former criminal judge, 
“When sitting and hearing testimony, I thought that one of the things we were 
doing was trying to make certain that something like that never happened again. I 
thought that was part of our reason for functioning. But as matters unfolded in 
Syria, the entire world could see what was going to happen and nothing was done, 
because the political interests of the major parties prevented the obvious action.” 
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Another criminal judge expressed his doubts about the deterrent effect of criminal 
proceedings. “I know in my heart that deterrence is not easily evidenced. But there 
is no empirical proof, after a lot of study, that certain kinds of sentencing actually 
work to deter crimes.” 
The discussion ended with two general statements about the status of justice 
in human society.  One participant bemoaned the fact that we never seem to learn 
from our mistakes. “Why is it so difficult to transfer wisdom from one generation 
to another?” he asked rhetorically. A colleague agreed, noting that humankind 
sometimes seems incapable not only of learning from the past but also from the 
present. He nonetheless offered a more optimistic view. “We seem to have an 
unreasoned hope for the future. It is part of the human condition.” 
Perhaps, in the end, it is in the name of this “unreasoned hope” that 
international justice is enacted. 
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BIIJ 2013 PARTICIPANT BIOGRAPHIES 
Participating Judges 
Carmel A. Agius (Malta) is currently the Vice President of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). He is also a member of the 
Appeals Chamber of both the ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR). He was first elected a Permanent Judge of the ICTY in March 
2001 and was re-elected in November 2004. In 2011 he was elected by the UN 
General Assembly to serve on the Roster of the Residual Mechanism of the two 
tribunals. Since his election to the Tribunal, Judge Agius has presided over the 
Br anin, Ori , and Popovi  et al trials. He also formed part of the Trial Chamber 
that rendered the sentencing judgments in the Dragan Nikoli  and Deronji  cases. 
He acted as Pre-trial Judge in several cases. Since 2009 he has served on the 
Appeals Chamber in several appeals from judgments of the ICTY and ICTR. 
Currently he is Presiding Judge in the Djordjevi  appeal. He also forms part of 
the Bureau of the ICTY and chairs the Rules Committee of the ICTY. Judge 
Agius was born in Malta in 1945 where he served on the Constitutional Court 
and the Court of Appeal before joining the ICTY. On several occasions he served 
as Acting Chief Justice. Between 1999 and 2006 he was also a member of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration of The Hague. 
Sophia A.B. Akuffo (Ghana) is the President of the African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights. She has been a Judge of the Court since 2006 and 
was re-elected in 2008. Between 2008 and 2012, she served as the Vice President 
of the Court. She has also been a Judge of the Supreme Court of Ghana since 
1995. She was educated at the Faculty of Law of the University of Ghana, 
Harvard Law School and the Ghana School of Law. She went on to work with 
the Law Firm of W. E. Fugar and Co. from 1977 to 1979; as a Legal Officer and 
Deputy Corporation Secretary for Ghana Airways Corporation from 1979 to 
1982; and Legal & Relations Manager for Mobil Oil Ghana Limited, with 
functional responsibility for Mobil Oil Liberia and Mobil Oil Sierra Leone, from 
1982 to 1992. She was also a Managing Consultant for Akuffo Legal 
Consultancy from 1992 to 1995. She is a member of Ghana’s General Legal 
Council, the Board of Trustees of Central University College and King’s 
University College, a fellow of the Commonwealth Judicial Education Institute, 
and a member of the Executive Board of the Commonwealth Judicial Education 
Institute. 
Sir David Baragwanath (New Zealand) is the elected President of the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) and Presiding Judge of the Appeals 
Chamber. Appointed in 2008, he has been permanently based in The Hague since 
2011, regularly working in Beirut. He was formerly Trial and Appellate Judge in 
New Zealand and President of the Law Commission, and concurrently Presiding 
Judge of the final court of Samoa. As Queen’s Counsel, Sir David was briefed 
from a number of jurisdictions in public and private law, domestic and 
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international, commercial and criminal law.  He led for indigenous Maori in test 
cases concerning land, forests, fisheries, and broadcasting, which, reversing 
settled policy, contributed to their renaissance. Sir David’s 50 years of 
experience around the world, and as prosecutor in the longest and most complex 
High Court criminal trial in New Zealand’s history, give him a unique voice in 
the international forum.  An Overseas Bencher of the Inner Temple London and 
an Honorary Professor at the University of Waikato (NZ), he has held visiting 
fellowships at Cambridge, Queen Mary London, the University of Hong Kong 
and the Netherland Institute of Advanced Studies in the Humanities and Social 
Sciences. He has received numerous awards and lectures widely. 
Dalveer Bhandari (India) joined the bench of the International Court of 
Justice in 2012. He has degrees in Humanities and Law from Jodhpur University 
(1968), a Master of Laws from Northwestern University, Chicago (1972), and a 
Doctor of Laws (LL.D. honoris causa) from Tumkur University, Karnataka 
(2010). Judge Bhandari served in the Indian higher judiciary for more than 21 
years as Senior Judge, Supreme Court of India (2005-2012); Chief Justice, High 
Court of Bombay (2004-2005); and Judge, High Court of Delhi (1991-2004). He 
has delivered many landmark judgments in various branches of law, including 
civil, commercial, criminal and public interest litigation, human rights, 
diplomatic immunities and privileges, environmental law, in the High Courts 
and in the Supreme Court. He has also practiced as Attorney-at-law and argued 
many important cases before the Supreme Court of India and other leading High 
Courts in India from 1977 to 1991. 
Sir Charles Michael Dennis Byron (St. Kitts & Nevis) has been President 
of the Caribbean Court of Justice since September 2011. He graduated from 
Cambridge University in 1966 with an M.A. and LL.B., after which he was in 
private practice throughout the Leeward Islands.  In 1982 he was appointed as a 
Judge of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court and in 1999, was appointed Chief 
Justice. During his tenure he engaged in many Judicial Reform Programs. In 
2004 Sir Dennis was appointed a Judge of the United Nations International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). He was elected President of the Tribunal 
from 2007 to 2011. Sir Dennis has been President of the Commonwealth Judicial 
Education Institute (CJEI) since 2000. In 2004, he was appointed an Honorary 
Bencher of the Honourable Society of the Inner Temple and holds the first Yogis 
& Keddy Chair in Human Rights Law at Dalhousie University. He was knighted 
in 2000 and was appointed a member of the Privy Council in 2004. 
Rowan Downing QC (Australia) holds the degrees of Bachelor of Arts, 
Bachelor of Laws and Master of Laws and is a senior Australian lawyer. In 2006 
he was appointed through the Secretary-General of the United Nations as an 
international Judge at the Pre-Trial Chamber of the Extraordinary Chambers in 
the Courts of Cambodia. He has held senior judicial positions in the Pacific 
region, including Judge of the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court of Vanuatu. 
He has also sat on a number of Australian tribunals. He has worked 
internationally for more than 20 years undertaking work in law reform, human 
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rights law, treaty implementation of human rights, refugee law, administrative 
law, anti-corruption law and the investigation and prosecution of transnational 
crime. Justice Downing has also worked with a number of multilateral 
organizations to improve the independence of the judiciary and systemic 
integrity within legal systems. He has appeared as an advocate in numerous 
human rights cases and provided advice to a number of governments concerning 
human rights, particularly the rights of women and children. He has extensive 
experience training advocates and members of the judiciary in South East Asia 
and the Pacific and has a particular interest in victimology. 
Shireen Avis Fisher (United States) served as an Appeals Judge at the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone from 2009 through 2013, and as its president 
between June 1, 2012 and June 4, 2013.  Prior to her appointment to the Special 
Court, she was appointed by High Representative, (Lord) Paddy Ashdown, as an 
International Judge of the War Crimes Chamber of the Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, where from 2005 through 2008 she adjudicated cases involving 
allegations of  crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide arising out of 
the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.  Between 2008 and 2009 she served as a 
Commissioner on the Kosovo Independent Judicial and Prosecutorial 
Commission. She was appointed to the Bench of the U.S. State of Vermont in 
1986, having been called to the State and Federal Bar ten years earlier. Justice 
Fisher represented the International Association of Women Judges from 2002 
through 2012 as an independent expert to the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law, participating in Special Sessions for the drafting and review of 
Hague Treaties on international family law. Justice Fisher received her Juris 
Doctor from the Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of America, and 
her LLM in International Human Rights Law from University College London.  
She has written and lectured extensively on international law. Her latest article, 
entitled “The SCSL and Gender Sensitivity,” was published in early 2014.  
Justice Fisher was appointed by the Secretary General of the United Nations to 
the Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone in October 2013. 
Diego García-Sayán (Peru) is Judge of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights and was its President until 31 December 2013 when his second term 
ended. He is also President of the independent commission appointed by the 
Peruvian government to organize and inaugurate the Museum of Memory, 
Tolerance and Social Inclusion, which is currently under construction. He was 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Peru (July 2001-July 2002) and Minister of Justice 
of Peru during the democratic transitional government (2000-2001). Previously 
he was a member of the National Congress of Peru. From May to November 
2007 he was Head of the Electoral Mission of the Organization of American 
States in Guatemala. From 1992 to 1994, he was Representative of the UN 
Secretary-General in charge of verifying the implementation of the El Salvador 
Peace Accords. He was also a member of the UN Negotiating Team in the 
Guatemalan peace negotiations between the Government and the Unidad 
Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca. Dr. García-Sayán is a professor with 
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great academic experience, author of several publications, and a member of many 
national and international institutions. 
Vagn Joensen (Denmark) is the President of the United Nations 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. He was recently re-elected to serve 
a second presidential term commencing from 27 May 2013. Judge Joensen 
joined the Tribunal in May 2007 as ad litem Judge and a member of Trial 
Chamber III. He has been the Chairperson of the Tribunal’s Rules Committee 
since its inception in 2007, and was Vice-President of the Tribunal from August 
2011 until February 2012. He was elected in December 2011 as a Judge of the 
successor to the ICTR and ICTY, the Mechanism for International Criminal 
Tribunals, and has served as Duty Judge for its Arusha Branch since 2 July 
2012. Before joining the ICTR, Judge Joensen was a Judge at the Danish High 
Court, Eastern Division, in Copenhagen since 1994 and served as an 
International Judge in Kosovo for UNMIK from 2001 to 2002. Born in 1950, 
Judge Joensen obtained a Master’s of Law in 1973 at the University of Aarhus, 
and has studied at the City of London College and Harvard Law School. Judge 
Joensen served in the Danish Ministry of Justice until he was appointed a Judge 
at the City Court of Copenhagen in 1982, when he was teaching constitutional, 
criminal and civil law at the Law Faculty of the University of Aarhus and at the 
University of Copenhagen. 
Sanji Mmasenono Monageng (Botswana) is currently the First Vice 
President of the International Criminal Court and a member of the Appeals 
Division. She joined the Court in March 2009. She previously served as a High 
Court Judge in the Kingdom of Swaziland, responsible for criminal and civil 
cases as well as constitutional matters, as a Commonwealth Expert. Prior to this, 
she served as a Judge of the High Court of the Republic of the Gambia in the 
same capacity. She started her legal career as a Magistrate in Botswana. Judge 
Monageng has wide experience in the promotion and protection of human rights, 
having been a member of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, appointed by the African Union, between 2003 and 2009, and was 
appointed as the Commission’s Chairperson in November 2007. She has also 
chaired one of the special mechanisms of the Commission, the Follow-Up 
Committee on torture, inhumane, degrading and other treatment. Judge 
Monageng has given a number of lectures on human rights issues, criminal law, 
humanitarian law and many other areas of the law. She also served as Deputy 
Chief Litigation Officer in the United Nations Observer Mission to South Africa 
in 1994. Judge Monageng served as the founding Chief Executive Officer of the 
Law Society of Botswana for many years. She possesses expertise in women’s 
human rights issues, indigenous peoples and communities, torture, and children, 
among other areas. She is a member of many international organizations 
including the International Association of Women Judges, the International 
Commission of Jurists, and the International Society for the Reform of Criminal 
Law. Judge Monageng has sat on numerous national, regional and international 
boards. 
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Howard Morrison (United Kingdom) was elected to the bench of the 
International Criminal Court in March 2012 and assigned to the Trial Division. 
After graduating in law from London University, doing voluntary teaching in 
West Africa, and serving in the military, Judge Morrison was called to the Bar by 
Grays Inn in 1977. He practiced on the Midland and Oxford Circuit with spells 
abroad on Foreign Office contracts in Fiji as Chief Magistrate and in Anguilla in 
the Caribbean as Attorney General. He was also called to the Bars of Fiji and the 
Caribbean Supreme Court. He practiced in criminal law, defending and 
prosecuting in the UK and defending in courts martial, from 1986 to 1998 when 
he started war crimes and genocide defense work at the International Criminal 
Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. In 2001 he was appointed 
Queen’s Counsel and in 2004 a Circuit Judge. He has remained active in teaching 
international criminal and humanitarian law worldwide. He has published widely 
in journals and contributed book chapters on ICL. In 2008 he was appointed 
Senior Judge of the Sovereign base areas of Cyprus and Master of the Bench of 
Grays Inn, and in 2009 was appointed a Judge of the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon by the UN Secretary-General. Following the resignation of Lord 
Bonomy, the UK Judge to the Yugoslav Tribunal, Judge Morrison was asked by 
the UN to take his place and in 2011 was elected to the International Criminal 
Court by the Assembly of States Parties at the UN in New York. He is an 
Honorary Professor of Law at Leicester University and a Senior Fellow of 
Cambridge University’s International Law Centre. He was a Distinguished 
Visiting Fellow at Monash University and has been a visiting lecturer at 
universities in the UK, the US, Holland and Italy. 
Erik Møse (Norway) of the Supreme Court of Norway has been a Judge at 
the European Court of Human Rights since 2011. He previously served as Judge 
(1999-2009) and President (2003-2007) of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda; Judge of the Court of Appeals in Oslo (1993-1999); Supreme Court 
Barrister (Attorney General’s office, civil affairs, 1986-1993); and before that 
Head of Division in the Ministry of Justice and Deputy Judge. Judge Møse has 
been a part-time lecturer at the University of Oslo and published books and 
articles in the field of human rights. He has chaired many international and 
national committees in the field of human rights and is Honorary Doctor at the 
University of Essex. 
Hisashi Owada (Japan) has been a Judge of the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) in The Hague since 2003 and was former President of the Court 
(20092012). Before being appointed to the ICJ, he was President of the Japan 
Institute of International Affairs. One of his country’s most respected diplomats, 
Judge Owada previously served as Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, as 
well as Permanent Representative of Japan to the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) in Paris, and Permanent Representative 
of Japan to the United Nations in New York. In the academic field, Judge Owada 
has taught for 25 years at Tokyo University, and more recently at Waseda 
University as a Professor of International Law and Organization. He has also for 
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taught for many years at Harvard Law School, Columbia Law School, and New 
York University Law School. He is a member of l’Institut de Droit International 
and is currently its President. He is an Honorary Professor at the University of 
Leiden and also Professorial Academic Adviser at Hiroshima University. Judge 
Owada is the author of numerous writings on international legal affairs. 
Fausto Pocar (Italy) has been a Judge with the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia since February 2000. He was President from 
November 2005 until November 2008. Since his appointment, he has served first 
as a Judge in a Trial Chamber and later in the Appeals Chamber of ICTY and 
ICTR, where he is still sitting. Pocar has long-standing experience in United 
Nations activities, in particular in the field of human rights and humanitarian law. 
He has served as a member and President of the Human Rights Committee and 
was appointed Special Representative of the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights for visits to Chechnya and the Russian Federation in 1995 and 1996. He 
has also been the Italian delegate to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space and its Legal Subcommittee. He is a Professor Emeritus of International 
Law at the Law Faculty of the University of Milan, where he has also served as 
Dean of the Faculty of Political Sciences and Vice Rector. He is the author of 
numerous publications on human rights and humanitarian law, private 
international law and European law. He has lectured at The Hague Academy of 
International Law and is a member and Treasurer of l’Institut de Droit 
International, and President of the International Institute of Humanitarian Law 
(Sanremo). 
Ricardo Ramírez Hernández (Mexico) was appointed a member of the 
World Trade Organization’s (WTO) highest court, the Appellate Body, in June 
2009. At 40, he was the youngest Judge ever to serve in this court. Last March he 
was reappointed by the WTO Membership for a second four-year term in office, 
starting on 1 July 2013. He currently holds the position of Chairperson in the 
Appellate Body. For almost three years Judge Ramírez was head of the 
International Trade Practice for Latin America at Chadbourne & Parke, S.C. For 
more than 11 years, he was Deputy General Counsel for Trade Negotiations of 
the Ministry of Economy in Mexico where he provided advice on trade and 
competition policy matters related to all trade agreements signed by Mexico. 
Judge Ramírez has been appointed as panelist/arbitrator in various proceedings 
under NAFTA and ICSID. Also, he was appointed Independent Trade Expert of 
APEC in 2008. He is Chair of International Trade Law Professors Association at 
the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM). He has a law degree 
from the Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana in Mexico and a Master’s in 
International Legal Studies from the American University Washington College of 
Law. 
Judge Helmut Tuerk (Austria) has been a Judge of the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in Hamburg since October 2005 and served as 
Vice President from 2008 to 2011. He obtained a Doctorate in Law from the 
University of Vienna in 1963 and subsequently studied at the College of Europe, 
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in Bruges, Belgium. In 1965 he joined the Austrian Federal Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs, and served as Legal Advisor, as Ambassador to the USA, the 
Commonwealth of the Bahamas, the Holy See, the Sovereign Military Order of 
Malta, the Republic of San Marino as well as Director General of the Office of 
the Austrian Federal President. For many years he was a member of the Austrian 
delegation to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and 
also represented his country at numerous other international meetings and 
negotiations. In 1989 he was the Chairman of the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the 
United Nations General Assembly. In 1997-1998 he served as President of the 
Meeting of States Parties of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea. Judge Tuerk is the author of numerous publications in the field of 
international law, in particular the law of the sea. 
 
BIIJ Co-Directors 
 
Linda Carter (United States) is a Professor of Law and Co-Director of the 
Global Center, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, Sacramento, 
California. She has assisted with the Brandeis Institute for International Judges 
since 2003 and also participated in two Brandeis-sponsored West African 
Colloquia for judges of the Supreme Courts in West Africa. Her teaching and 
research areas are criminal law and procedure, evidence, capital punishment 
law, international criminal law, and comparative legal systems. Prior to entering 
academia, Prof. Carter was an Attorney in the honors program of the Civil 
Rights Division of the United States Department of Justice in Washington, D.C., 
where she litigated voting, housing, and education discrimination cases. She 
then worked as an attorney with the Legal Defender Association in Salt Lake 
City, Utah, where she represented indigent criminal defendants on misdemeanor 
and felony charges. Her most recent publications include a book, co-edited with 
Judge Fausto Pocar, International Criminal Procedure: The Interface of Civil 
Law and Common Law Legal Systems, and articles on the future of the 
International Criminal Court and on the combinations of international and 
national post-conflict processes in Sierra Leone and Rwanda. In 2007 Prof. 
Carter served as a Visiting Professional in the Appeals Chamber of the 
International Criminal Court and as a Legal Researcher at the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. She taught in Senegal in the spring of 2009 as a 
Fulbright Senior Specialist; recently lectured at the University of Sierra Leone; 
and directed a summer program in Kampala, Uganda in May 2013.  She is a 
member of numerous professional organizations, including election to the 
American Law Institute (ALI). 
Richard J. Goldstone (South Africa) is widely regarded by the 
international community as one of the leading advocates for justice and human 
rights in the world today. He was a judge in South Africa for 23 years. From 
1995 to 2003 he was a justice of the Constitutional Court of South Africa. 
Justice Goldstone was the Chief Prosecutor of the United Nations Criminal 
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Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. From 1991 to 1994, he 
chaired what became known as the Goldstone Commission, an independent 
judicial commission that investigated activities and people who posed a threat to 
the restoration of civil rights during the transition to post-apartheid South 
Africa. During his career, he has addressed problems of fidelity to law in unjust 
regimes and worked to define judicial ethics for international judges. He was 
educated at King Edward VII School and the University of the Witwatersrand, 
where he graduated in 1962. From August 1999 to December 2001, he was the 
Chairperson of the International Independent Inquiry on Kosovo. He is the 
Honorary President of the Human Rights Institute of the International Bar 
Association, and he was also a member of the Independent Inquiry Committee 
into the UN Oil for Food Programme (the Volcker Committee). He chaired a 
United Nations Committee to advise on the archives of the Criminal Tribunals 
for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Since 2002, he has been a director of 
the Brandeis Institute for International Judges. He has served as a visiting 
professor at Harvard, Georgetown, Fordham, Stanford, Yale and New York 
University. He is presently a Distinguished Visiting Visitor from the Judiciary at 
Georgetown University Law Center. He chairs the Advisory Boards of 
Brandeis’ International Center for Ethics, Justice and Public Life and the 
Coalition for the International Criminal Court. In 2008, he was named the 
recipient of the MacArthur Award for International Justice and as the first “The 
Hague Peace Philosopher.” In April 2009, he was named to head a fact-finding 
mission investigating alleged war crimes during the conflict in Gaza from 
December 2008 to January 2009. He is a member of a Commission of Jurists 
appointed in 2012 to inquire into the cause of the death of UN Secretary-General 
Dag Hammarskjöld, who was killed in an aircraft crash in 1961. 
 
Brandeis University Convenors 
 
Leigh Swigart (United States) is Director of Programs in International 
Justice and Society at the International Center for Ethics, Justice and Public Life 
at Brandeis University. She oversees the Brandeis Institute for International 
Judges, Brandeis Judicial Colloquia, as well as other programs for members of 
the judicial and human rights communities worldwide. Swigart holds a Ph.D. in 
Sociocultural Anthropology from the University of Washington. She has wide 
experience in international education, including as Director of the West African 
Research Center in Dakar, Senegal, and is a two-time Fulbright Scholar and 
recipient of the Wenner-Gren Foundation Fellowship for Anthropological 
Research. Her academic work and publications have focused on language use in 
post-colonial Africa, recent African immigration and refugee resettlement in the 
United States, and international justice. She is co-author of The International 
Judge: an Introduction to the Men and Women Who Decide the World’s Cases 
(with Daniel Terris and Cesare Romano, foreword by US Supreme Court Justice 
Sonia Sotomayor, 2007: University Press of New England). 
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Daniel Terris (United States) is Director of the International Center for 
Ethics, Justice and Public Life at Brandeis University. An intellectual historian, 
he has written on race and ethnicity in the United States, business ethics, and 
international law and justice. His books include Ethics at Work: Creating Virtue 
in an American Corporation (2005: Brandeis University Press) and The 
International Judge: An Introduction to the Men and Women Who Decide the 
World’s Cases (with Leigh Swigart and Cesare Romano, foreword by US 
Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor, 2007: University Press of New 
England). As an academic entrepreneur and leader, Dr. Terris has overseen the 
development of many signature programs at Brandeis, including the Brandeis 
Institute for International Judges, the Brandeis-Genesis Institute for Russian 
Jewry, and the Master’s Program in Coexistence and Conflict. Dr. Terris has also 
served as the University’s Vice President for Global Affairs, building new 
connections for Brandeis in Israel, India, The Netherlands, and other countries. 
 
Raoul Wallenberg Institute and Lund University Faculty of Law 
 
Professor Göran Melander (Sweden) is the founder and former Director of 
the Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law and 
Professor of Law (Emeritus) at Lund University, Sweden. He holds a Doctor of 
Laws degree from Lund University. He has extensive expertise and experience in 
the areas of human rights, humanitarian law, and refugee law, and has taught and 
acted as Expert Consultant on human rights issues in Africa, Asia, Europe, and 
Latin America. An internationally acclaimed scholar of human rights and 
international law, Prof. Melander is the author and editor of numerous books and 
articles and is active in a number of international human rights events and 
organizations. From 2001 to 2004, he was a member of the UN Committee on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. 
Professor Christina Moëll (Sweden) is Professor of Fiscal Law and Dean of 
the Faculty of Law at Lund University. Before joining the Faculty of Law in 
1997, Christina Moëll served at the Administrative Court of Appeals in 
Gothenburg. Her research has followed two main themes: 1) taxes on 
international trade with special focus on trade with developing countries and 2) 
administrative and procedural matters in tax law. She has been a member of the 
Board of Trustees of the Raoul Wallenberg Institute since 2008. 
Rolf Ring (Sweden) is the Deputy Director of the Raoul Wallenberg 
Institute. Prior to joining the Institute, he worked as a project-coordinator for the 
Swedish Red Cross and served as an assistant to the Chair of International Law at 
the Faculty of Law, Lund University. Rolf Ring has worked with development, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of human rights capacity 
development programs worldwide. He holds an LL.M. from Lund University. 
 
Other Participants 
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Hans Corell (Sweden) served as Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs 
and the Legal Counsel of the United Nations from March 1994 to March 2004. In 
this capacity, he was head of the Office of Legal Affairs in the UN Secretariat. 
Before joining the UN, he was Ambassador and Under-Secretary for Legal and 
Consular Affairs in the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs from 1984 to 1994. 
From 1962 to 1972, he served first as a law clerk and later as a judge in circuit 
courts and appeal courts. In 1972, he joined the Ministry of Justice, where he 
became a Director in 1979. In 1980 he was appointed judge of Appeal but 
remained in the Ministry where he became the Chief Legal Officer in 1981. He 
was a member of Sweden’s delegation to the UN General Assembly 1985-1993 
and had several assignments related to the Council of Europe, OECD, and the 
CSCE (now OSCE). He was co-author of the 1993 CSCE proposal for the 
establishment of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. During his 
UN tenure he was involved in the establishment of all existing international 
criminal tribunals except the one in Lebanon, including being the Secretary-
General’s representative at the Rome Conference on the ICC in 1998. Since his 
retirement from public service in 2004, he has been engaged in many different 
activities in the legal field, inter alia as legal adviser, lecturer, and member of 
different boards. Among other activities, he is involved in the work of the 
International Bar Association and the Hague Institute for the Internationalisation 
of Law. He was Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Raoul Wallenberg 
Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law from 2006 to 2012. He is a 
member of the Commission of Jurists appointed in 2012 to inquire into the cause 
of the death of UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, who was killed in an 
aircraft crash in 1961. 
Carl-Henrik Ehrenkrona (Sweden) grew up in Stockholm. He performed 
his academic studies at the University of Uppsala (law and history) and took his 
Master’s degree in law in 1974. From 1974 to 1986 he served as a law clerk and 
Assistant Judge in different district courts in Sweden, mainly in the District Court 
of Uppsala. From 1986 to 1998 he served at the International Law department of 
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Stockholm as Legal Director, mainly dealing 
with human rights issues, and acted as Counsel of the Swedish Government 
(agent) before the European Court of Human Rights. In 1998 he was appointed 
Judge in the High Court (Court of Appeal) of Stockholm where he served as 
President of one of the chambers of the Court. From 2001 to 2002 he served as 
Chairman of the Aliens Appeals Board, dealing with asylum cases. In 2002 he 
was appointed Director General for Legal Affairs (Chief Legal Adviser) in the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Since 2010, Mr. Ehrenkrona has been Ambassador 
and the Permanent Representative of Sweden to the Council of Europe in 
Strasbourg. Mr. Ehrenkrona has served in several expert committees on human 
rights within the Council of Europe, in the Committees of Public International 
Law in Strasbourg and Brussels and has been a member of the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration in The Hague since 2004. He has also, together with colleagues 
from Canada, India, Mexico and Poland, been responsible for organizing and 
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chairing the meetings with legal advisers of the UN member states, which take 
place each year in New York during international law week. He is the author of a 
Swedish commentary on the European Convention on Human Rights and a 
number of articles on Convention issues, mainly in Swedish law journals. 
 
Rapporteurs 
 
Evgenia Pavlovskaia (Russia and Sweden) is a doctoral student at the Law 
Faculty in Lund University. The area of her research is environmental law. Her 
doctoral thesis has the title Sustainability Criteria in a Legal Context and Control 
of their Fulfilment—an Analysis Based on the EU Policy for Transport Biofuels. 
Its main purpose is to develop an approach, and to help investigate the use of 
sustainability criteria in legal frameworks as a tool to promote and safeguard 
sustainable production and quality of products, with particular emphasis on the 
issue of control of the fulfillment of sustainability criteria. During her doctoral 
studies, Ms. Pavlovskaia has also been engaged in teaching environmental law to 
the second year students at the Law Faculty. 
Matthew Scott (Australia) is a solicitor of England and Wales specializing 
in immigration and asylum law and a doctoral student at the Faculty of Law at 
Lund University. His doctoral research is provisionally entitled Non-Refoulement 
and Climate Change-Related Migration: International and Human Rights Law 
and Litigation. The thesis considers the role that national, regional, and 
international courts and tribunals can play in determining the scope of States’ 
non-refoulement obligations in the context of migration associated with natural 
disasters that can be linked to climate change. Before joining the Faculty of Law, 
Matthew worked for the Immigration Advisory Service in the United Kingdom 
and the Australian Department of Immigration and Citizenship in both the 
Russian Federation and Australia. 
Britta Sjöstedt (Sweden) is a doctoral student at the Faculty of Law at Lund 
University, researching and teaching public international law, mostly 
international humanitarian law. Her research project concerns the protection of 
the environment during armed conflict. In particular, it revolves around questions 
of how international humanitarian law and international environmental law can 
be reconciled to enhance environmental protection in times of armed conflict. 
Britta completed her Master of Law at Lund University in 2009. Previous work 
experience includes working as an assistant for Dr. Jacobsson at the UN 
International Law Commission and as a clerk at an administrative court in 
Stockholm. 
 
Interns 
 
Anastasia Austin (United States) is a senior at Brandeis University, 
majoring in International Global Studies and Russian Studies. She studied in The 
Hague from February to July 2013. Her time there was spent exploring the field 
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of international law and justice, first as a student of the Brandeis in The Hague 
program and later as an intern at the Defence Office of the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon. Anastasia was born in the Russian Federation and moved to the United 
States at age six. Prior to coming to Brandeis University, she attended the 
International Baccalaureate Program at St. Petersburg High School in Florida, 
where she focused on English, History, and Psychology. The program introduced 
her to global perspectives on politics and history, which was supplemented by 
her involvement in the Model United Nations and the Debate Team. Anastasia is 
fluent in Russian and speaks French at an intermediate level. 
Alex Glomset (United States) is a senior at Brandeis University, where he is 
majoring in International and Global Studies with minors in French and Legal 
Studies. He studied with the Brandeis in The Hague program during Summer 
2012, and also spent a semester abroad in Geneva where he interned for Genève 
Droits de l’Homme.  During Summer 2013, he was an intern with Physicians for 
Human Rights, where he worked on its Sexual Violence in Conflict Zones 
program. Alex has had many opportunities to travel and live abroad, with lengthy 
stays in Senegal, Australia, and various countries in Europe. His aim upon 
graduation is to work in some capacity in the international sphere. 
Rida Abu Rass (Israel) is a senior at Brandeis University, majoring in 
International and Global Studies and Philosophy. Originally from Taibe, a 
Palestinian town located outside the West Bank, his family moved to Jaffa in 
pursuit of better education. In 2008, he was accepted to study at the United 
World College in Norway, where he was exposed to a diverse international 
community in a boarding school atmosphere. As an activist, he hopes to 
contribute to the solution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and he plans to build 
a career in international relations as well. 
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BRANDEIS INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR ETHICS, JUSTICE AND PUBLIC LIFE 
The mission of the International Center for Ethics, Justice and Public Life is 
to develop effective responses to conflict and injustice by offering innovative 
approaches to coexistence, strengthening the work of international courts, and 
encouraging ethical practice in civic and professional life. The Center was 
founded in 1998 through the generosity of Abraham D. Feinberg. 
 
The International Center for Ethics, Justice 
and Public Life 
Brandeis University, MS 086 
Waltham, MA 02454-9110 
+1-781-736-8577 Tel 
+1-781-736-8561 Fax 
www.brandeis.edu/ethics 
www.facebook.com/EthicsBrandeis 
www.twitter.com/EthicsBrandeis 
 
ABOUT BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY 
Brandeis University is the youngest private research university in the United 
States and the only nonsectarian college or university in the nation founded by 
the American Jewish community. 
Named for the late Louis Dembitz Brandeis, the distinguished associate 
justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, Brandeis was founded in 1948. The University 
has a long tradition of engagement in international law, culminating in the 
establishment of the Brandeis Institute for International Judges. 
Brandeis combines the faculty and facilities of a powerful world-class 
research university with the intimacy and dedication to teaching of a small 
college. A culturally diverse student body is drawn from all 50 U.S. states and 
more than 56 countries. Total enrollment, including some 1,200 graduate 
students, is approximately 4,200. With a student to faculty ratio of 8 to 1 and a 
median class size of 17, personal attention is at the core of an education that 
balances academic excellence with extracurricular activities. 
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BRANDEIS INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL JUDGES 2002-2012 
 
2002, Brandeis University, Waltham, Massachusetts, USA. 
“The New International Jurisprudence: Building Legitimacy for International 
Courts and Tribunals.” 
 
2003, Salzburg, Austria. 
“Authority and Autonomy: Defining the Role of International and Regional 
Courts.” 
 
2004, Salzburg, Austria. 
“Complementarity and Cooperation: The Challenges of International Justice.” 
 
2006, Dakar, Senegal. 
“Complementarity and Cooperation: International Courts in a Diverse World.” 
 
2007, Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, USA. 
“Independence and Interdependence: the Delicate Balance of International 
Justice.” 
 
2009, Port of Spain, Trinidad. 
“International Justice: Past, Present, and Future.” 
 
2010, Salzburg, Austria. 
“Toward an International Rule of Law.” 
 
2012, Carmona, Spain. 
“The International Rule of Law: Coordination and Collaboration in Global 
Justice.” 
 
~ Published reports of all Institutes may be found at: 
http://www.brandeis.edu/ethics/internationaljustice/biij/index.html. ~ 
 
OTHER PUBLICATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR ETHICS, JUSTICE AND 
PUBLIC LIFE: 
 
Both Sides of the Bench: New Perspectives on International Law and Human 
Rights 
 
The Challenges of International Justice 
 
Justice Across Cultures 
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The Legacy of International Criminal Courts and Tribunals in Africa, with a 
focus on the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
 
The West African Judicial Colloquia 
 
The North American Judicial Colloquium 
 
The South American Judicial Colloquium 
 
~ Other publications are available at 
http://www.brandeis.edu/ethics/internationaljustice/publications.html. ~ 
 
